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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was called upon to decide a
number of novel issues in the past year. Although the court did not consider
issues or reach decisions as dramatic in impact as the United States Supreme
Court decisions of the last term,' it has continued to reach significant
decisions of high quality based on sound policy considerations conforming
with generally well-settled principles.
The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of issues in federal
criminal procedure cases decided in this circuit for the criminal lawyer in
active litigation. It is designed to be more informative than analytical.
Although the focus of the article is to provide a sound research tool for the
practicing attorney, an attempt has been made to examine the decisions to
determine if they conform with past experience, general policy considerations
and the requirements of reason. Some of the issues are novel. In the author's
view they require more attention than can be given here. Nonetheless, a
beginning has been made which will hopefully be followed by more extensive
commentary.
A brief explanation of the format may be appropriate. The article is
structured to discuss issues as they occur during litigation of a criminal case,
beginning with eye-witness identification and concluding with sentencing.
The author has offered comments at the beginning of each section concerning
certain fundamental principles which are doubtless well understood by the
active criminal lawyer. It is the author's belief that a short restatement of these
basic principles will aid in the discussion of the issues which the court was
called upon to decide.
* United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois; Member Illinois Bar; J.D., DePaul
University.
1. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2902 (1976) (death penalty); Profitt v. Florida, 96
S. Ct. 2960 (1976) (death penalty); Jurek v. Texas, 96S. Ct. 2950(1976) (death penalty); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976) (death penalty); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001
(1976) (death penalty); Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (seizure of individual's
business records from his offices did not violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (attorney's production of his client's
tax records pursuant to a lawful Internal Revenue Service summons does not violate taxpayer's
fifth amendment privilege); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (fourth amendment does
not protect a bank customer from a government subpoena duces tecum directing the bank to
produce its records of transactions with the customer); Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976)
(Miranda v. Arizona does not permit government to impeach through the use of a defendant's
post-arrest silence); Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976) (no existence of a "work
product" exception under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970)).
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EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION
The two significant opinions 2 concerning the eye-witness identification
area were United States v. Kimbrough3 and United States v. Grose.4 The
cases applied the Neil v. Biggers5 standard to eye-witness identifications in
federal prosecutions. By so doing, they foreclosed the possibility that "the
Seventh Circuit might adopt a per se supervisory rule of exclusion, at least as
to out-of-court identifications, in federal prosecutions where law enforcement
officials have used unnecessarily suggestive procedures." 6
The significance of these cases stems from the dispute over the effect of
Biggers on the exclusionary principles first enunciated in the Wade-Gilbert-
Stovall trilogy.7 In Stovall, the United States Supreme Court condemned
eye-witness testimony that was "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable misidentification'' 8 as to violate defendant's right to due
process of law. Biggers, reyling in part on an earlier decision, 9 stated that the
test for exclusion was whether under the "totality of the circumstances" the
identification was unreliable. 10 Mr. Justice Powell, however, noted the
possibility of a different result in a rather cryptic passage of the opinion. He
referred to a stricter rule which would bar an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure when a more reliable one is available.11 Several commentators
have argued that the Court did not apply this stricter rule only because
Biggers involved a pre-Stovall confrontation and trial. 12 Whether a stricter
2. Another Seventh Circuit case, United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750(7th Cir.
1976), decided this past year, will not be discussed herein. The case applied United States ex rel.
Pierce v. Cannon, 508 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1974), and represents a restatement of prior law.
3. 528 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976).
4. 525 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976).
5. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
6. Haddad, Criminal Procedure and Habeas Corpus, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 294 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Haddad].
7. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
8. 388 U.S. at 302.
9. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
10. 409 U.S. at 196 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967)).
11. Id. at 198-99:
What is less clear from our cases is whether, as intimated by the District Court,
unnecessary suggestiveness alone requires the exclusion of evidence. While we are
inclined to agree with the courts below that the police did not exhaust all possibilities in
seeking persons physically comparable to respondent, we do not think that the
evidence must therefore be excluded. The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of
unnecessarily suggestive confrontations would be to deter the police from using a less
reliable procedure where a more reliable one may be available, and would not be based
on the assumption that in every instance the admission of evidence of such a
confrontation offends due process. Such a rule would have no place in the present
case, since both the confrontation and the trial preceded Stovall v. Denno, supra, when
we first gave notice that the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything
other than a matter to be argued to the jury (citations omitted).
12. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, & Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the
Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 719, 776-77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
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standard would be applied in a post-Stovall confrontation and trial has yet to
be determined by the Court.1 3
The stricter test, apparently followed in the Fourth and Second Cir-
cuits,14 excludes any evidence, reliable or not, obtained through improper
police practices in order to prevent those practices. The rationale in support of
the stricter test is that due process is concerned with procedural fairness,
irrespective of guilt or innocence. Further, the Wade trilogy was concerned
with police abuse of the identification process. The stricter rule would
encourage police to use the least suggestive methods of identification.' 5
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a more permissive interpretation. It has
held that the constitutional right recognized in Stovall is violated only where,
following an unnecessarily suggestive police practice, the identification
evidence which is in fact unreliable is admitted at trial. The focus is on the
reliability of the identification, not the suggestive police practice. This
approach seems to be the most consistent with Biggers since there the Court
was most troubled by the district court's conclusion that "unnecessary
suggestiveness alone requires the exclusion of evidence." 1 6 Under the
permissive approach, the responsibility lies with the prosecutor to assure that
the identifications were ascertained by reliable procedures. 17
Prior to Kimbrough and Grose, the Seventh Circuit, relying on Biggers,
had adopted the more permissive approach in habeas corpus proceedings. In
United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges,'8 (then) Judge Stevens stated the
essentials of the "totality of the circumstances" test under Biggers. The court
must first determine if the method of identification was suggestive. If so, it
must inquire as to whether it was justified by an exigent circumstance. If it
was unjustified, the court must determine if it was otherwise reliable under the
standard set forth in Biggers. A mere showing of a suggestive procedure
coupled with a lack of an exigent circumstance does not violate due process. 19
Grano]. But see Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due
Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1114-21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pulaski]. See note
13 infra.
13. But see Pulaski, supra note 12, at 1116: "The Court in Neil clearly opted for a
permissive interpretation of the due process test .... "
14. See Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 957
(1976); Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973). See also
United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ruddv. Florida, 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1973); Workman v. Cardwell, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
15. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972); Pulaski, supra note 12, at 1114; Grano, supra
note 12, at 782.
16. 409 U.S. at 198-99.
17. See Pulaski, supra note 12, at 1117. For the analogous area of post-indictment
photographic displays, see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973): "The primary
safeguard against abuses of this kind is the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor, who, as so
often been said, may 'strike hard blows' but not 'foul ones.' "
18. 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
19. Id. at 404 n.21.
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Upon such a showing, the issue becomes whether under the "totality of the
circumstances" the identification was reliable even though the confrontation
procedure was suggestive. "[T]he constitutional error that the rule is intended
to avoid is an unfair trial, rather than merely an unfair identification
''20
In Kimbrough, the court applied the permissive approach to a federal
prosecution. The case involved the suggestive display of a photograph of the
defendant to a mail carrier who had been assaulted. Judge Bauer held that
under Biggers, the sole area of inquiry was whether the identification was
reliable. 21 The court found that the victim of the assault had ample opportuni-
ty to attentively observe the defendant. Further, the victim gave an accurate
description of the defendant and displayed a "total certainty" in his identifi-
cation. Finally, the photographic identification took place one and one half
hours after the assault. While finding the procedure showed "poor law
enforcement practice," the court nevertheless affirmed the defendant's
conviction. 22
The court dealt with a related issue in Grose. The defendant's picture
was published in the Milwaukee papers shortly after his arrest for a bank
robbery. The publicity, he argued, created a substantial risk of misidentifica-
tion and thus post-indictment identification of him should have been sup-
pressed. Defense counsel was permitted at trial to elicit testimony that the
witnesses had observed the pictures in the newspaper. Citing United States v.
Broadhead,23 the court held that the fact that the witnesses had observed the
pictures went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. The court
found no substantial likelihood of misidentification. The witnesses "had
ample opportunity, at close range and under adequate lighting, to observe the
perpetrator at the time of the robbery. "24 The totality of the circumstances
clearly revealed an opportunity to identify the witnesses.
The Second Circuit has recently indicated an inclination to adhere to the
stricter rule. In Brathwaite v. Manson,25 the court expressed the view that
Biggers involved a pre-Stovall confrontation and trial and that since both the
photographic identification and the in-court identification were subsequent to
Stovall, the identification should be excluded: "No rules less stringent than
these can force police administrators and prosecutors to adopt procedures that
will give fair assurance against the awful risks of misidentification." 26
20. Id. at 408.
21. 528 F.2d at 1242.
22. Id. at 1247.
23. 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
24. 525 F.2d at 1118.
25. 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1737 (1976).
26. Id. at 371.
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This interpretation of Biggers was not urged in Kimbrough and Grose.
The court did not consider the more restrictive approach. The Seventh
Circuit's approach is more sensible. Due process protects against the admis-
sion of unreliable evidence. It does not necessarily bar an unreliable proce-
dure. A reliable witness will not impermissibly prejudice a defendant. The
focus, therefore, is properly limited only to the witness' ability to observe. 27
The stringent test promulgated in Biggers assures this ability. A per se rule of
exclusion would unnecessarily foreclose a witness who was well acquainted
with the defendant and had ample opportunity to observe him commit an
act.28 The Seventh Circuit's approach is clearly consistent with the limits of
due process.
29
STATEMENTS, ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
Voluntariness
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination comes into play
when law enforcement officers take a suspect into custody or otherwise
restrict his freedom of action in any "significant way." 30 After receiving
proper Miranda warnings, the suspect can waive his rights. 31 He may also
rescind the waiver at any time prior to or during interrogation. 32 The existence
of the warnings is merely one factor in determining voluntariness. 33 In order
to determine if a statement is voluntary, one must examine whether under the
totality of the circumstances, the suspect's statement resulted from a rational
and free decision to waive his rights. 34
27. This evaluation of the witness' ability to observe is similar to the "independent basis
test" under Wade and Gilbert. However, there is one fundamental distinction between the due
process inquiry and the independent basis test. In the former, the defendant must carry the
burden of proof. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 302 (1967); N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION 67 (1972). Under Wade, the
government is required to prove "by clear and convincing evidence," the independent basis for
the identification. 388 U.S. at 240.
28. See United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397,408 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1016 (1975).
29. For other recent opinions which have followed the Seventh Circuit, see Caver v.
Alabama, 537 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir. 1976) ("This rule, unlike the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment, is aimed not at deterring unfair police practices but at the reliability vel non
of the truth-finding process"); United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976). See also
United States v. Young, 529 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1975) (independent basis for in-court
identification).
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
31. Id, The accused may not be threatened, tricked or cajoled into waiver. Id. at 476. See
United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3173 (1976).
32. 384 U.S. at 473-74; United States v. James, 493 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
849 (1974).
33. United States ex rel. Hayward v. Johnson, 508 F.2d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Guaydacan, 470 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (confession not voluntary in spite
of the fact that warnings were given).
34. United States ex rel. Hayward v. Johnson, 508 F.2d 322, 326-27 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53,55-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950(1975); United States v.
Pomares, 499 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The opinions of the Seventh Circuit concerning voluntariness were brief.
In United States v. Buchanan,a3 the defendant received warnings on two
occasions. He admitted at trial he had been advised of his rights and had been
under no physical coercion. In holding that the defendant's will had not been
overborne by the arresting officers, the court noted that a trial court's finding
on the question of the defendant's confession must be sustained unless clearly
erroneous.3 6 The defendant in United States v. Reynolds 7 maintained that
although he had voluntarily signed his name to a confession, he had done so
only as a result of promises made by the government. Relying on Bram v.
United States ,"8 he argued that the confessiOn should have been suppressed.
Prior to the confession, the government agent told the defendant "there was
probably a possibility that if he [the defendant] cooperates and if he was
involved, that it would be more lenient on him." 3 9 The court upheld the
confession. The statement was made in response to the defendant's inquiry
and was posed as a mere "possibility." Rejecting a "wooden" application of
Brain, the court found the confession to be voluntary.
The court also briefly considered the effect of the trial court's failure to
articulate correct standards for a motion to suppress a confession. In United
States v. Davis,4° the defendant claimed that the court failed to state the
correct standards in denying his motion to suppress .4 1 The court held that the
denial of the motion found adequate support in the record and met the
requirements of Lego v. Twomey .42 Although the trial court did articulate
35. 529 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1725 (1976).
36. Id. at 1151-52.
37. 532 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1976).
38. 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897). See also United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53, 55-57 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975) (16-year-old who was told by FBI agent he might get off
with probation if he told the "real story" and that he might be left "holding the bag" if he did not,
voluntarily confessed); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
873 (1972) (promise by agent insufficient to establish involuntariness). But see Shotwell Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1963) (confession a result of a direct governmental
promise of immunity).
39. 532 F.2d at 1157.
40. 532 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976). Defendant also alleged that he had been improperly advised
of his rights. He was orally given warnings twice and read them once. Although he initially
refused to sign a waiver form, he later signed this and a full confession. The initial declination to
sign the form was "only one factor among others to be considered in determining the voluntari-
ness of the statements." Id. at 26. He also contended that he did not understand that he had a right
to immediate appointment of a federal defender. The court rejected the claim, noting that, to its
knowledge, no court has held the standard Miranda warnings concerning the appointment of an
attorney inaccurate. Id.
41. The trial court stated: "So, I do not believe you ... have supported the motion by clear
and convincing evidence, or even by the weight of the evidence." 532 F.2d at 26.
42. 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972):
[Wihen a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal
defendant at his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the
confession was in fact voluntarily rendered. Thus, the prosecution must prove at least
by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. Of course, the
States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.
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incorrect standards, it did consider the Miranda requirements in ruling.43 By
so holding, the Seventh Circuit apparently focused on the trial court's actual
reliance on the Miranda requirements and the definitiveness of its ruling.
Construction of Miranda
In the past year the United States Supreme Court rejected the Seventh
Circuit's rule that Miranda warnings must be given during non-custodial
interrogations by Internal Revenue Service intelligence agents. In United
States v. Dickerson," the circuit had enunciated its view that the warnings
must be given to suspects before such non-custodial interrogations. The court
reasoned that the transfer of the case to the Intelligence Division indicated that
the investigation had focused on the suspect and hence the warnings were
required.
In Beckwith v. United States," the Court rejected this minority posi-
tion.46 Accordingly, statements made to such agents and records obtained
during the course of the interview are now admissible, even though no
warnings are given. The taxpayer in Beckwith had argued for the Seventh
Circuit's approach, contending that Miranda was applicable because he was
the "focus" of the investigation. Therefore, he was in the functional and legal
equivalent of the classic Miranda situation.
As the Court noted, such a proposition ignores the central point on which
Miranda turned: the coercive aspect of custodial interrogation.47 Justice
43. See United States v. Chapman, 448 F.2d 1381, 1385-87 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 929 (1972). The trial court's conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear
from the record. United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Sims v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967).
44. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969). United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974)
affirmed the role announced in Dickerson. See Haddad, supra note 6, at 297.
45. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
46. The weight of authority was clearly in accord with the Beckwith decision. See, e.g.,
United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 16 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765,
771 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947,950 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415,417-20 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1027-31 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 221-22 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
47. The Court stated:
An interview with government agents in a situation such as the one shown by this
record simply does not present the elements which the Miranda Court found so
inherently coercive as to require its holding. Although the "focus" of an investigation
may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was
his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself in the custodial
situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding. Miranda
specifically defined "focus," for its purposes, as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.". . It may well be'true, as petitioner
contends that the "starting point" for the criminal prosecution was the information
obtained from petitioner and the records exhibited by him. But this amounts to no more
than saying that a tax return signed by a taxpayer can be the "starting point" for a
prosecution.
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Brennan, dissenting, viewed the interrogation at issue as having the "practi-
cal consequence" of compelling the taxpayer to make disclosures and was
thus fully comparable to the formal custodial situation involved in Miran-
da .48 The majority pointed out that "custodial interrogation" as specifically
defined in Miranda, means "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in any significant way." 49 Since such situations did not amount to
custody, then the circuit's rule clearly did not conform with the requirements
of Miranda. Thus, as a result of Beckwith, the sole case decided by the circuit
in this area is of little consequence. 50
In the 1975 term, the Court, in a plurality opinion in United States v.
Mandujano,51 held that Miranda warnings need not be given to a grand jury
witness who is in the position of a "virtual" or "putative" defendant.52 As in
Beckwith, the Court stressed the lack of custodial coercion envisoned in
Miranda. In the Court's view, Miranda "simply did not perceive judicial
inquiries and custodial interrogations as equivalents." 53
The defendant in the Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Smith51
argued that his conviction for perjury before a grand jury should be reversed
since he was the "virtual" or "putative" defendant at the time he testified.
The court sustained the conviction on two grounds: (1) he was not a virtual
425 U.S. at 347 (citation omitted). The court went on to admit that in special instances, a
non-custodial interrogation may involve some form of coercion or overbearing by law enforce-
ment officials, but noted that in this case, the court of appeals had determined that the interview-
was entirely free from coercion. Id. at 347-48.
48. 425 U.S. at 349-51.
49. 425 U.S. at 347 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444).
50. In United States v. Dreske, 536 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1976), the defendant urged the court
to extend the Oliver-Dickerson rule to interrogations by a Collection Division agent. Such
interrogations are normally conducted prior to formal referral to the Intelligence Division for
possible criminal violations. Indicating that it would not have extended the doctrine to such
cases, the court recognized that Beckwith assured the admissibility of such statements. Id. at
195.
51. 96 S. Ct. 1768 (1976).
52. Id. In Mandujano, the defendant was being prosecuted for perjury for making false
statements before a grand jury. He moved to suppress his grand jury testimony on the grounds
that he was a putative defendant at the time and had not been given proper Miranda warnings.
Although the Court denied the motion to suppress, there was no clear majority opinion. Justices
Burger, White, Powell and Rehnquist held that a putative defendant is not entitled to Miranda
warnings prior to testifying before a grand jury. Id. at 1778-80. Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurred, but emphasized that in the absence of a knowing waiver of the right against
self-incrimination, the testimony should be unavailable in a subsequent prosecution for the
investigated crime. Id. at 1788. In addition, they indicated that a putative defendant should be
warned of the possibility of self-incrimination and also informed of the right to consult with
counsel and, if necessary, to have one appointed. Id. at 1788, 1791. Justices Stewart and
Blackmun also concurred on the grounds that the fifth amendment does not protect the
commission of perjury. Since the testimony was not introduced in the prosecution for the
investigated crime, they declined to consider the self-incrimination issue. Id. at 1792-93.
53. Id. at 1778.
54. 538 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1976).
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defendant at the time of questioning and, (2) under Mandujano, the govern-
ment was not required to give such warnings. 55 At the time of his testimony,
the grand jury was investigating the tax fraud of a third party. The Internal
Revenue Service had not opened a case file on the defendant, nor had the
prosecutor or the foreman formed an opinion that he had performed an illegal
action. Hence, he was not a putative or virtual defendant.56 Mandujano, as
well as a prior Seventh Circuit opinion, 57 dictated that the statement need not
be suppressed.
Bruton Problems
In Bruton v. United States,58 the admission of a defendant's post-
conspiracy confession implicating a codefendant was held to be reversible
error if the confessing defendant did not testify. To admit such statements, the
Court held, denies the accused his sixth amendment right of confrontation.
59
Where the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant,
the confession is admissible against him in a joint trial.60 It is self-evident that
to be excluded, the confession must clearly inculpate the codefendant.
6 1
The issue of two Seventh Circuit cases decided last year involving a
Bruton problem was whether a codefendant was sufficiently identified by
another codefendant in his admission. The two cases appeared to turn on the
existence of other substantial evidenceconnecting the defendant to the crime.
In United States v. Cook,62 two brothers, Laurell and Bobby Cook, were
convicted of bank robbery. Shortly after an arrest on another charge, Bobby
Cook made a statement implicating his brother. While testifying to the
statement, the government witness stated Bobby had said "[tihat after the
55. Id. at 161.
56. In view of Mandujano, the court deemed it unnecessary to distinguish the cases which
held that a witness before a grand jury was a virtual defendant.
57. United States v. DiGiovanni, 397 F.2d 409,412(7th Cir. 1968). See also United States v.
Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1974).
58. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
59. By so holding, the Court overruled United States v. Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). In
Delli Paoli, the Court held that a limiting instruction ordering the jury to consider the confession
solely against the declarant was sufficient.
60. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). See also United States v. Everett, 457 F.2d 813
(9th Cir. 1972). The key to Bruton is the existence of an opportunity to cross-examine the person
making the statement.
61. United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Catalano, 491
F.2d 262, 273 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); United States v. Cassino, 467 F.2d 610,
623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973). Such a confession is admissible if all
references to other codefendants have been deleted. United States v. Gray, 462 F.2d 164 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); United States v. Trudo, 449 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 197 1), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972). A violation of Bruton does not always require a reversal of the
criminal conviction. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
62. 530 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the search issue raised in Cook, see note
107 infra and accompanying text.
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bank robbery, when cars were switched, that his brother Larry. "63 The
witness was then cut off by counsel's objections.
The district court refused to grant a motion for mistrial. It held the
statement was not prejudicial since it was not clear that "his brother Larry"
referred to the defendant. Additionally, the court ruled the statement was not
prejudicial because it was not intelligible and because the court had given a
curative instruction. The Seventh Circuit disagreed. It stated that the refer-
ence to "Larry" and to Bobby Cook's brother left little room for an
alternative inference by the jury. Further, the timing and the contents of the
testimony of the government witness dictated that "Larry" would be con-
nected to the defendant Laurell Cook. 64 While the statement clearly referred
to Laurell Cook, it was the strongest evidence in the case against him, and
hence its admission required reversal.
In United States v. Rajewski,65 a codefendant stated to a government
witness that "the kid did the job himself." The other defendant alleged that
"the kid" was a direct reference to him. The trial court held the statement was
ambiguous and that the testimony immediately prior to the statement referred
to the other defendant. Since the statement was a "minor, off-hand com-
ment" and there was other substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt, the
circuit court held that the trial court had correctly refused to grant a mistrial.
Derivative Evidence of a Compelled Confession
In perhaps the most significant case of the year in the confession area, the
Seventh Circuit intimated that it would only exclude third party testimony
obtained in violation of Miranda in exceptional circumstances. By so doing,
the court suggested resolution of a question which the United States Supreme
Court had refused to resolve in Michigan v. Tucker.66 Tucker held that third
party testimonial evidence would not be excluded if the arrest had taken place
before the Miranda decision. 67 In Tucker, the Court ruled that since the
Miranda rules were "prophylactic standards" and not constitutional rights of
themselves, the fruits of the failure to give the appropriate warning68 were not
required to be excluded where the confession was otherwise voluntary and
63. 530 F.2d at 150 (quoting transcript at 405-06).
64. 530 F.2d at 150. Citing Bruton, the court also held that the curative instruction was
insufficient to prevent the prejudice.
65. 526 F.2d 149, 156 (7th Cir. 1975).
66. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
67. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), limited the applicability of Miranda to
trials that began after June 13, 1966, the date of the Miranda decision. The defendant's trial in'
Tucker began October 18, 1966 and hence his statement to police was excluded. People v.
Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 325 (1969). See also 417 U.S. at 437.
68. In Tucker, the sole warning the defendant was not given was his right to appointed
counsel. 417 U.S. at 438.
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elicited in conformance with then good faith police practice. In other words,
the Court held that, although the safeguard of the fifth amendment had been
breached, the actual right against self incrimination had not been violated. 69
Hence, the third party evidence was properly admitted.
In contrast to Tucker, the facts in United States ex rel. Hudson v.
Cannon70 indicate gross police misbehavior. When the defendant was ar-
rested for murder on May 22, 1967, he was not given any warnings. He was
interrogated by several policeman for a five-and-one-half hour period without
food, water, cigarettes or rest. Several requests to phone an attorney were
denied. He was told that he could make a call after he told police what "they
wanted to hear." 7'
The court's approach, as in Tucker was divided into two inquiries: did
the police activity violate a constitutional right and if so, should the derivative
testimony be excluded. Chief Judge Fairchild found that the facts of Hudson
indicated not only a failure to give Miranda warnings, but also a denial of his
sixth amendment right to counsel under Escobedo v. Illinois.72 The facts of
the case indicated an involuntary confession under traditional standards as
well.7 3 Since the confession was involuntary, unlike Tucker, the defendant's
fifth amendment right had been violated. The court further found that
Escobedo defined a constitutional right and not a mere "prophylactic
standard." Therefore, failure to allow the defendant the opportunity to
contact an attorney constituted a violation of his rights under the sixth
amendment. 7
Under Wong Sun v. United States75 the fruits of the involuntary
confession and the sixth amendment violation must be excluded. "Nothing in
Tucker suggests that there need not be exclusion of evidence where a state
court defendant can show that such testimony is the product of a coerced or
involuntary statement.' 76 Since the court found a fifth amendment violation
under traditional voluntariness standards and a violation of the sixth amend-
ment under Escobedo, it was not required to reach the narrow question of
whether third party testimony should be excluded upon a showing of a
69. Since there was no constitutional infringement, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963), did not require the exclusion of the derivative evidence. 417 U.S. at 445. The Court
went on to consider whether the evidence should have been excluded on some alternative ground.
See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41, 201 (1974).
70. 529 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 891. During questioning, Hudson implicated an accomplice who implicated a third
party. Both testified against him at trial.
72. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
73. See Greenwald-v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519(1968); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963). See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
74. 529 F.2d at 894.
75. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
76. 529 F.2d at 892.
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Miranda violation alone. Dicta in the case indicates that the members of the
court are undecided on the issue.
The court was divided on the issue of whether the fruits of a post-
Miranda failure to give warnings should be admitted. The majority con-
cluded that regardless of the fact that the interrogation occurred after the
decision, the deterrent effect of excluding such fruits is insufficient to justify
exclusion of otherwise reliable evidence. To the extent that the case rested on
the Miranda violation, the majority would have extended Tucker to a
post-Miranda arrest. Implicit in the majority's opinion is an expression of
concurrence with the view voiced by Justice White in Tucker that any benefits
of exclusion are far outweighed by the benefits of making relevant and
reliable testimony available to the finder of fact. 77
Although there was no discussion of its position, the majority's approach
can be easily justified. First, it is doubtful that the exclusion of fruits of such
violations would tend to deter improper police practice. This is a fundamental
consideration in determining the scope of the exclusionary rule. "Before we
penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves
a valid and useful purpose." 78 When an investigator interrogates a suspect,
the principal deterrent for a Miranda violation is the fact that the accused's
statements will be excluded. The exclusion of derivative evidence "adds
little" 79 to the deterrence factor. Hence the exclusion serves no "valid and
useful purpose." Furthermore, in the fifth amendment area, exclusion of
evidence has traditionally been justified by the additional concern that a
compelled confession is unreliable. Although the facts of Hudson unques-
tionably indicate that the confession was compelled, there was clearly no
reason to believe that the third party testimony would be untrustworthy simply
because the defendant was not advised of his rights. 80 Another consideration
is that the fifth amendment is limited to "the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from" 81 the lips of the defendant. The
77. 417 U.S. at 461:
Miranda having been applied in this Court only to the exclusion of the defendant's
own statements, I would not extend its prophylactic scope to bar the testimony of third
persons even though they have been identified by means of admissions that are
themselves inadmissible under Miranda. The arguable benefits from excluding such
testimony by way of possibly deterring police conduct that might compel admissions
are, in my view, far outweighed by the advantages of having relevant and probative
testimony, not obtained by actual coercion, available at criminal trials to aid in the
pursuit of truth. The same results would not necessarily obtain with respect to the
fruits of involuntary confessions.
78. Id. at 446.
79. 529 F.2d at 895.
80. Id. at 894.
81. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,252-53 (1910) (Holmes, J.). Assuming that Miranda
outlines mere prophylactic safeguards and a confession is otherwise voluntary, it is at best
arguable that such third party testimony would be deemed a result of compulsion because the
statement leading to the witness has been voluntarily given and the testimony is not coming from
the lips of the defendant.
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testimony of a third party is clearly not proof of a communication of the
defendant.
Chief Judge Fairchild suggested a different approach. He was more
inclined to "heed Tucker's emphasis on the 'good faith' of the police officers
involved and bar the admission of the third party testimonial fruits."82 He did
not expressly articulate his reason for this view. However, his approach is, in
one sense, arguably consistent with Tucker. The exclusionary rule focuses on
negligent or wilful conduct which results in deprivation of a right. By refusing
to admit the fruits of such conduct, the courts are endeavoring to instill in law
enforcement a greater degree of concern for the accused's rights to the
greatest extent possible. Good faith in a post-Miranda situation would
demand the giving of all the warnings.3 In Tucker, the court held that the
interest in deterring unlawful police practice would not be furthered where the
police were acting in good faith under then known constitutional standards. In
Hudson, however, there was no such showing of good faith since the
interrogation occurred after Miranda when an officer would have been on
notice of proper procedures. Hence, under Fairchild's approach, the evidence
would have been excluded.
In sum, the differences between the two approaches are apparent. The
majority would find such evidence admissible presumably because it is
reliable and because the deterrent value of the exclusion is questionable.
Chief Judge Fairchild relies on the good faith of the officers. This require-
ment, which would be applied to all post-Miranda arrests, would arguably
result in the exclusion of all fruits of such violations.8 4 In the author's view,
the majority's approach is more sound because of the questionable effect of
the exclusionary rule on third party testimonial fruits in deterring such
conduct.
In Hudson, however, since a sufficient causal connection between the
third party testimony and the coercion, amounting to a fifth amendment
violation as well as the sixth amendment violation, had been pleaded, the
defendant was entitled to a hearing to show that the testimony was the fruit of
the violations. 85 The narrower issue, unfortunately, was not expressly de-
cided. Nevertheless, the ultimate significance of the case is the majority's
suggestion that the probative value of the fruits of a post-Miranda violation
outweighs the deterrent effect of excluding such evidence and hence the fruits
should be admitted.
82. 529 F.2d at 895.
83. This is so presumably because no police officer ten years after the Miranda decision
could be unaware of the requirements of the decision. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REV. 41, 199 (1974).
84. Under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 491 (1963), the state could
show that there was in fact no taint or circumstance which would purge or dissipate it.
Alternatively, it could show that it learned of the witnesses through an independent source.
85. 529 F.2d at 890.
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ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The fourth amendment principles governing arrest, search and seizure
situations are well-known. One's reasonable expectation of privacy in his
person or property is protected from unreasonable governmental intrusion
under the fourth amendment.16 Whether an intrusion is reasonable is deter-
mined by weighing the government's need to search and seize against the
individual's privacy interest. 87 When the balance swings toward permitting
the government to search, the individual's interests are still protected. First,
the government's need must be demonstrated by a- showing of probable
cause. 88 Second, the scope of the search or seizure is limited by the need for
the intrusion. 8
9
Despite the recognition of these basic principles, fourth amendment
decisions reflect a degree of confusion which is probably inevitable because
of the necessity of making case-by-case determinations as to how the
principles will be applied. 90 In the Seventh Circuit this year, arrest, search and
seizure decisions continued to provide fertile ground for discussion. No single
decision is of overwhelming import, but when taken together, the decisions
reveal both new insights and continuing lack of clarity. For example, a new
policy concern was expressed by the court and helpful discussions of third
party consent searches were articulated.
An example of the type of case-by-case analysis required to determine
probable cause to arrest without a warrant is found in United States ex rel.
Burbank v. Warden.91 In reversing the district court's grant of a habeas
corpus writ, the Seventh Circuit found that the lower court had ignored the
arresting officer's knowledge of the petitioner in making its probable cause
determination. 92 This failure resulted in the "police officer's development of
a detailed familiarity with the people and places on their beat [being] overly
discounted." ' 93 The court articulated its own policy with respect to such
knowledge:
The courts should encourage police officers to become involved in
the communities in which they work and permit them to use the
86. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,447-48 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-21 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,766-72 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172-73 (1952).
88. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,91 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115-16 (1964).
89. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-65 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26
(1968).
90. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971).
91. 535 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1976).
92. Id. at 365.
93. Id. at 366. The police officer, Fitzgerald, had lived and worked in the neighborhood
where the shooting took place for several years. He had seen the petitioner 40 to 50 times and also
knew petitioner's mother. Fitzgerald was familiar with the way petitioner dressed and was aware
of other specific things about him.
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knowledge so acquired in detecting criminal activity. In our view,
the third-party information conveyed to Detectives Fitzgerald and
Luth, together with Fitzgerald's own knowledge, gave them prob-
able cause to arrest him under the test of Beck v. Ohio.94
The court did not advocate that the policeman's knowledge alone should be
adequate for a finding of probable cause.95 It did indicate that where an
officer's decision to arrest is not based merely on speculation or suspicion of
criminal conduct or on subjective factors, probable cause may be established
in part by specific knowledge of a suspect's characteristics. The thoughtful
opinion by Judge Cummings on this point voices the court's support for
conscientious, concerned police work which deserves commendation. 96
The question raised in a second warrantless arrest case, United States v.
Fairchild,97 was whether warrantless arrests, like warrantless searches,
should be treated as presumptively invalid. 98 The court declined to discuss the
subject at length99 in light of the fact that the United States Supreme Court had
granted certiorari to the only case which had held such arrests to be
presumptively invalid.l1° This fact, combined with earlier Seventh Circuit
opinions which, although not addressing the issue squarely, were consistent
with the majority view, l01 led the court to conclude that the arrest was
valid.10 2 This judgment was vindicated by the Court's decision in United
States v. Watson. 03
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. The other information conveyed to the officers followed an initial investigation by the
policemen who were called to the scene of the shooting. That investigation produced fifteen
witnesses, including three who saw the petitioner enter and leave the place of the shooting. Those
three described him in detail. Other witnesses described the path the petitioner took after leaving
the store. The area to which the suspects were seen to flee was near where petitioner's mother
lived. Id. at 364-65.
96. The opinion was not unanimous. Judge Fairchild's dissent indicated that he believed
that the description of petitioner given by witnesses was not specific enough even when
combined with the arresting officer's knowledge for a finding of probable cause. Id. at 367.
The majority opinion cited United States v. Birdsong, 446 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1971), and
United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1101-04 (2d Cir. 1975), as support for its approval of the
use of the officer's knowledge to establish probable cause. Neither of these opinions involved the
same type of situation as Burbank. In both cases the information was gained in surveillance
operations directed at a particular group of people and involved an awareness of prior records of
the suspects.
97. 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
98. 526 F.2d at 188.
99. Judge Stevens noted that there were arguments in favor of imposing the same warrant
requirement for arrests as for searches. Id. at 188 n.6.
100. United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 820(1976); see
note 103 infra.
101. The cases cited by the court were United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494(7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1035 (1975), and United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974).
102. 526 F.2d at 188.
103. 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976). Watson claimed that his arrest and the subsequent search of his car
were in violation of his fourth amendment rights because the postal inspector who made the arrest
had failed to obtain an arrest warrant despite the fact that there was time to do so. The Court
noted that statutory provisions (18 U.S.C. § 3601(a) (1970)) and regulations (39 C.F.R. § 232.5(a)
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Two cases this year gave the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to consider
the standards it had previously approved for determining the validity of third
party consent searches in United States v. Matlock. 104 In Matlock, the court
had approved the trial court's holding that a defendant's fourth amendment
rights could be waived by a third party's consent to a search only "if it was
proved that the reasonable appearance of authority to consent existed and that
just prior to the search, facts existed showing actual authority to consent." 105
In United States v. Cook, 0 6 the defendant argued that neither require-
ment of Matlock had been met. Judge Bauer had no difficulty in finding that
there was a reasonable appearance of authority for the third party, the owner
of the premises, to consent to the search despite the defendant's contention
that the investigating agents should have made an actual inquiry as to her
authority. 107
Whether the government had met its burden as to the second part of the
Matlock test required a subtle interpretation of language in the Court's
opinion. The Court had noted that when the government seeks to justify a
warrantless search pursuant to a third party's consent, the consent to the
search may be shown to have been given by a third party if that person has
''common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects sought to be inspected."' 8 The Court further elaborated on the
common authority concept. 109 The necessary common authority rests, not on
property concepts, but on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access
for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of
the co-inhabitants has the right to permit inspection. . . and...
(1975)) empower certain postal employees to make warrantless arrests in given situations. The
Court further analyzed arrest requirements under the fourth amendment, focusing on the fact
that the issue is whether or not probable cause for the arrest existed. Although there is a judicial
preference for warrants, the Court declined to transform the preference into a constitutional rule.
96 S. Ct. at 828.
The appellant in Fairchild made exactly the same claim as Watson had. His arrest was also
made by federal officers, agents of the United States Secret Service who are also statutorily
authorized to make warrantless arrests (18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1970)).
104. 476 F.2d 1083, 1087 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
105. 476 F.2d at 1087. The reversal of the Supreme Court was based on the fact that hearsay
statements were excluded during the suppression hearings in the district court. 415 U.S. at
172-77.
106. 530 F.2d 145 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 909 (1976).
107. 530 F.2d at 147. The consenting party in Cook was the owner of the poultry house
searched. The house was used as a storage area by the owners and the defendant, who lived
nearby. The interior of the house was allotted mostly to the defendant although the owners used
one corner permanently and reserved the right to preempt defendant's space should they need it.
The decision that there was a reasonable appearance of authority to consent was based on
the fact that the owner's consent was itself evidence of her authority, the premises searched were
near her house, and on the consent form signed for the FBI she referred to the house several
times with the word "my." Id. at 148.
108. 415 U.S. at 171.
109. Id. n.7.
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the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might
permit the common areas to be searched.'
Cook argued that the language of the Court's opinion must be read as
requiring actual use of the premises by the consenting party or joint access for
most purposes. Neither of these standards was met here because the facts
indicated that the owner-consentor neither used the shed searched nor had
access to it for most purposes. The owners merely stored things in one corner
of the shed and admittedly had not been in the shed or used it for any other
purpose while Cook used it.111 On its own motion the court noted that one
decision had urged an actual use emphasis in the analysis of the Matlock
standards, but it distinguished that case because it was clear that there the
consenter had had no access to the searched premises for any purpose and thus
the detailed Matlock analysis was not required. 112
The Seventh Circuit accepted the analysis of the government that the
Court's common authority definition emphasized the assumption of risk
aspect of third party consent search situations.'1 13 Cook had assumed the risk,
the court concluded, because he knew the storage space he was allotted could
be preempted at any time by the owners and since he knew that they actually
used some of the space. This resulted in a finding that there was actual
authority for the owner to consent to a search of the premises. 114
In United States v. Harris11 5 the consent of a third party to search the
defendant's apartment was found invalid. Neither part of the Matlock test had
been met in the court's opinion. The decision focused on the absence of any
facts supporting the conclusion that the defendant and the party who con-
sented to the search were mutual users of the property with joint access and
control for most purposes. 16 The consenting party was not a joint lessee, had
no key, had only been alone in the apartment once, and had known the
defendant only three weeks. There was no actual authority on these facts and
since the arresting officers knew these facts when they conducted the search,
they had no reasonable basis to believe that there was such authority. 117
Although the Harris opinion made no reference to Cook, the use of the
assumption of risk standard can be inferred from the statement that "it can
hardly be surmised that he [the defendant] expected Edwardsen [the
110. Id.
111. 530 F.2d at 148.
112. 530 F.2d at 149. The court cited United States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284(8th Cir. 1974).
113. 530 F.2d at 149. The court's acceptance of this analysis of the Supreme Court's
language was based on its conclusion that the assumption of risk concept has predominated in
recent fourth amendment cases.
114. Id.
115. 534 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1976).
116. Id. at 96-97.
117. Id. at 97.
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consenter] to enter and leave the locked apartment at will." " 8 The standard is
imprecise in that it must be determined on a case-by-case basis, but it is a
reasonable one, consistent with earlier decisions in this circuit and in the
Supreme Court. 119 Whether the requisite common authority exists ultimately
rests on the reasonable expectations of the parties as to the access each has to
the property.
The assumption of risk theme introduced in Cook was evident in another
case involving an unlawful search issue, United States v. Ressler.120 Judge
Bauer's opinion analyzed the defendants' contentions that evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant should have been suppressed because the warrant had
been issued based on information gained during an illegal search. The
investigating agents had entered the home by the ruse of asking for one
defendant by a nickname.' 2 1 During the ensuing visit, discussions about the
sale of firearms took place and weapons were displayed. Based on the
information obtained during this visit, a search warrant was secured for the
premises of one defendant.
The case was governed by the standards delineated in Lewis v. United
States.122 The court interpreted Lewis to be based on the rationale "that an
entry by an undercover agent is not illegal if he entered for the 'very purposes
contemplated by the occupant. "1 23 Where an agent is not present for the
purposes contemplated by the occupant who admits him, the suspect does not
voluntarily consent to the exposure of information. He exposes it in response
to an affirmative representation. Thus the suspect does not assume the risk
that the exposed information may be reported to government authorities. 124
Although the use of the defendant's nickname in Ressler could be
perceived as a misrepresentation that the agents and the defendants were
acquaintances, the entry was permissible for two reasons. The first reason is
well-articulated by the court: "A person is expected to recognize his
acquaintances and any information revealed to one who claims to be an
acquaintance, but who is in fact not one, must be viewed as exposed at the
suspect's risk.' '125 In addition, once the defendants acquiesced in the pres-
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731,740(199); Hayes v. Cady, 500 F.2d 1212, 1214
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); United States v. Piet, 498 F.2d 178 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974).
Other cases which support the assumption of risk analysis include, Virgin Islands v. Gereau,
502 F.2d 914, 926 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57,72 (2d Cir. 1974).
120. 536 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 210.
122. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
123. 536 F.2d at 211 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)).
124. 536 F.2d at 211-12.
125. Id. at 212.
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ence of the agents for the purpose of dealing in firearms, the defendants
"converted their home into a 'commercial center' not protected by the Fourth
Amendment." 1
26
The majority opinion in Ressler indicated approval of the reasoning in
the only other case found to be on point, Whiting v. United States.127 The
central theme of that analysis was that if identity misrepresentation such as
occurred in Ressler were to be outlawed, any law enforcement effort
involving decoys would collapse.' 28 Because certain types of crime are all
but impossible to attack without such techniques, it would be unreasonable to
eliminate them altogether. Within the guidelines of this reading of Lewis, the
government can pursue its investigations and the person engaged in such
crimes transacts with unknown people at his risk. The suspect's interests are
protected by the requirement that an agent's pose be used for the purpose
contemplated by the suspect when their encounter takes place.
The "search incident to arrest" doctrine has developed into a trouble-
some concept for many courts. 129 However, in a clear, concise opinion
written by Judge Tone, discussion and application of the basic principles of
Chimel v. California 130 resulted in the reversal of the defendant's conviction
in United States v. Griffith. 13 1
Griffith had been arrested in his motel room, which had been entered by
the searching officers with a pass-key. A search of the room had ensued. 132
The court found that the search of the bathroom and other closed areas was
clearly prohibited by Chimel. The focus of the discussion was whether the
search of an open paper bag was validly made incident to the arrest.'133 The
validity of the search under that theory was dependent on whether the bag was
within an area from which the defendant might gain access to a weapon or to
destructible evidence. Because the defendant was under the control of the
officers at the time the search occurred the permissible area of search was
126. Id.
127. 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963).
128. 321 F.2d at 77.
129. For a discussion of the evolution of the "search incident" doctrine, the problems which
now exist with such cases and proposals designed to resolve the difficulties, see Aaronsen &
Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident to Arrest, 64
GEO. L.J. 53 (1975).
130. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
131. 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976).
132. One officer observed, walked to and opened a brown paper bag which held clear
glassine bags containing white tablets. The bathroom was searched which revealed money hidden
in a towel. A suitcase was found and opened which held more pills. In preparation for the trip to
the police station, all defendant's belongings were gathered and additional items seized by the
officers. Id. at 902-03.
133. The government also argued that the search of the paper bag was permissible because it
was in plain view. The court rejected that analysis because the policeman's inspection of the bag
was not inadvertent. Id. at 903.
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narrowed. 34 At the time of the arrest the defendant was not in the immediate
area of the bag. If it had come within the area of his immediate control it
would have occurred through the actions of the officers in permitting it. Thus
the search was unlawful.
In passing, the court gave recognition to the fact that in this case the
defendant was not handcuffed and that other cases have recognized this as an
important factor in the determination of the permissible scope of a search
incident to arrest.1 35 This court discounted that factor. The reason for the
limited search permitted under Chimel is the protection of law enforcement
officers and evidence. Whether a danger to either exists must be decided on
the facts of each case. The failure of the officers to handcuff the arrestee was
an indication of their lack of concern for danger to either themselves or the
evidence and could not be used as justification for a wider scope of search. 13 6
The cases discussed above contribute to an understanding of the law
construing the fourth amendment and cases decided under it. Two other cases
decided this term provide a sharp contrast to the clarity of reasoning and
enunciation of policy demonstrated in those cases.
At the police station following her arrest on an unrelated charge, the
defendant in United States v. Jeffers'37 requested one of the arresting officers
to get her nerve pills from a coin purse in her handbag. One of the officers
obliged. While looking for the pills, apparently in the coin purse, he found a
note which, when unfolded, revealed a small quantity of heroin. Further
search of the handbag turned up a second packet of heroin. The admission of
both quantities of heroin in evidence at defendant's trial was upheld.
The court correctly concluded that the validity of the second search
depended on the validity of the first one. 1 38 It also correctly noted, almost in
passing, that the search could be justified as one pursuant to a custodial arrest
according to United States v. Edwards.139 Inexplicably, however, the court
analogized Jeffers to United States v. Robinson'4° because the officers
conducted the search out of a "sense of duty or curiosity to examine the
contents of a suspicious object. "141 In addition to the fact that this motive for
conducting a search is violative of the basic premise that suspicion is not a
sufficient basis for initiating a search, 142 it appears that the search could have
134. Id. at 904.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 524 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1975).
138. Id. at 254.
139. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
140. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
141. 524 F.2d at 255.
142. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burbank v. Warden, 535 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1976),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
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been fully justified on the basis of consent. The defendant requested the
officers to search for her pills and the discovery of the first quantity of heroin
was made in the course of a search clearly within the scope of that consent. 
143
By her request Jeffers gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy she
might have had and waived her right to fourth amendment protection.' 44
A final case, United States v. Bertucci,145 involving a warrantless
vehicle search, presents some of the same analytical problems. A van was
stopped by state police officers after it was observed weaving down the road.
Initial inquiry revealed no evidence of alcohol and no other violation of the
law. 146 Nevertheless the officers conducted a routine search for alcohol and
weapons which ultimately resulted in the discovery that the van contained
cartons of stolen merchandise.
Judge Hoffman's majority opinion held that there had been no violation
of defendants' fourth amendment rights. He concluded that the officers had
probable cause to search the entire van for alcohol and weapons. The fact that
the van had been weaving, combined with the "furtive" attempts of the
defendants to stop the police from viewing the interior of the van, made it
reasonable for the officers to expect to find the sought items, despite the fact
that nothing else indicated the defendants had been drinking. These limited,
initial intrusions were acceptable on "grounds of inspections for weapons and
intoxicants, 'plain view,' 'consent,' and 'automobile' exceptions to the
warrant rule." 147 The same inspections produced sufficient information to
establish reasonable grounds for a full search of the shipping cartons.
Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion' 48 posed the issue simply: "[W]as
there probable cause for a search without a warrant?" 149 He disagreed with
the majority opinion on every point. Because no traffic citations were issued,
no arrests made and no weapons found, there was no reason for the defendants
to be detained. '5 0 The conditions necessary for the application of the vehicle
exception to the warrant requirement were not met. 15' The cartons in the van
143. A consent search is confined to the scope of the consent given. United States v. Jeffers,
524 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1975). For another opinion which thoughtfully analyzes a consent search
situation, see United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976).
144. The majority opinion argues that Jeffers gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy
when she asked for her pills. There is no quarrel with that conclusion. It is the context within
which the conclusion is reached that causes problems.
145. 532 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1976).
146. The driver of the van produced a valid Illinois driver's license.
147. Id. at 1147.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1148.
150. Id.
151. To validate a warrantless search of a vehicle, probable cause must exist to believe that
the vehicle contains contraband or instrumentalities of a crime and exigent circumstances must
be shown to exist. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970), and Circuit Note:
Criminal, 64 GEO. L.J. 167, 208 (1975).
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aroused the suspicion of the officers, but that was not sufficient probable
cause for a warrantless search. Because no exigent circumstances were
evident, neither requirement to justify a warrantless vehicle search was
met. 152
Continuing his criticism of the majority's approach, Judge Swygert
found that the inadvertence requirement of the plain view exception was not
met. 153 Considering the totality of the circumstances, 15 4 the government had
failed to meet its burden of showing that any consent to the search was freely
and voluntarily given. 155 Clearly, the differing interpretation of the facts
played a key role in the conflicting conclusions of the two opinions. The real
difficulty with the majority opinion, however, is its failure to analyze and
articulate the basis of its conclusion that the exceptions to the warrant
requirement were met. 15
6
Because the fourth amendment provides the basis for such fundamental
protections, decisions which analyze whether rights developed pursuant to
that amendment have been fully recognized must be clear. The confusing
state of fourth amendment law has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court, which has made conscientious attempts to clarify areas of
difficulty. Recent criticism of the direction in which the Court may be going
in this area makes it all the more important for the lower courts to carefully
consider the cases which are presented to them. This year the Seventh Circuit
appeared to reocgnize this need in most respects. In those cases where the
need is ignored, guidelines for law enforcement officials become less clear
and the position of those subject to the actions of such officials is tenuous.
This is an unacceptable situation for either the government or the potential
defendant.
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
The most significant case in the wiretapping and electronic surveillance
area in the Seventh Circuit in the past year was United States v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. 157 The case did not fall within Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,158 but rather, turned on the authority
of a district court to order private communications carriers to aid in the
152. 532 F.2d at 1148, 1150.
153. Id. at 1148-49. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
154. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
155. 532 F.2d at 1149.
156. 532 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1976).
157. 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). Another case decided in the Seventh Circuit in the past year
involving the federal wiretap laws was United States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1126 (1975). Freeman held that monitoring of a defendant's telephone by the
communications carrier was both necessary and in line with the wiretap statutes. The fruits of
such monitoring were not required to be suppressed.
158. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
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installation of a pen register device for surveillance purposes. 159
The factual situation in Illinois Bell is not complicated. In an ex parte
proceeding, Chief Judge James B. Parsons of the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois issued a two-part order. It first authorized the
installation of a pen register device on a phone. Second, it affirmatively
required the Illinois Bell Telephone Company to provide "facilities . .
information . . . and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
interception."t6° The order was issued upon a finding of probable cause to
believe that evidence of commission of two misdemeanor violations of the
Internal Revenue Code161 would be obtained through the use of the pen
register. Illinois Bell appealed the issuance of the order on the grounds that the
district court had neither inherent nor statutory authority to compel the
company to provide such assistance.
The circuit court initially held that pen registers are not controlled by the
provisions of title III. Legislative history 62 and case law, 163 as well as the act
itself, clearly indicate that such a device was outside the intended scope of
title 111.164 It was clearly unnecessary to consider whether there had been
proper compliance with this section. Whether or not the issuance of the order
159. For a definition of a pen register device, see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505,
549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
A pen register is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line and usually
installed at a central telephone facility. It records on a paper tape all numbers dialed
from that line. It does not identify the telephone numbers from which incoming calls
originated, nor does it reveal whether any call, either incoming or outgoing, was
completed. Its use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversations. The
mechanical complexities of a pen register are explicated in the opinion of the District
Court. 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1038-41 (D. Md. 1972).
See also In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373, 377 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975).
160. 531 F.2d at 811.
161. I.R.C. §§ 7262, 7272 (amended 1958, 1965).
162. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968):
Paragraph (4) defines "intercept" to include the aural acquisition of the contents
of any wire or oral communication by any electronic, mechanical, or other device.
Other forms of surveillance are not within the proposed legislation. An examination of
telephone company records by law enforcement agents in the regular course of their
duties would be lawful because it would not be an "interception." The proposed
legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The use of a "pen
register," for example, would be permissible. The proposed legislation is intended to
protect the privacy of the communication itself and not the means of communication
(citations omitted).
See also Blakely & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 657 (1968). The author, who was credited with primary authorship of the title, see United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 517 n.7, 526 n. 16 (1974), stated that the title was not intended to
prevent the tracing of phone calls by the use of a pen register.
163. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v.
Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. Vega, 52 F.R.D. 503, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see United States v.
Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (issuance of a pen register falls within the title when it is
issued in connection with a wiretap order).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970).
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was proper would be determined "entirely on compliance with the constitu-
tional requirements of the Fourth Amendment." 165 Since the court issued the
order for the pen register on the basis of probable cause following a procedure
designed to comply with the fourth amendment, it had validly exercised its
authority.
Illinois Bell argued, however, that the court had neither statutory nor
inherent authority to compel a private communications carrier to implement
such a device. 166 Illinois Bell relied chiefly on Application of the United
States'67 in support of its theory. Application I held that under title III, the
court had no inherent or statutory authority to order a communications carrier
to implement a wire tap. Though title III was subsequently amended, 168
Illinois Bell argued by analogy that outside title III the court had no authority
to issue such an order. The immediate amendment indicated congressional
recognition that the district court lacked authority to issue such orders. It was
for this reason that Congress was motivated to amend this title.
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. It was unlikely, the court
held, that Congress' initial failure to include such a provision was purposeful
if it had amended the Act so quickly: "We are of the opinion that Congress
originally presumed that either the communications carriers would voluntar-
ily cooperate to effectuate the purposes of the Act or that power existed in the
courts to compel compliance with otherwise valid orders authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance. "169 The swift enactment of the amendment 170 provided
"strong and persuasive authority, by analogy" 171 that the district court could
compel compliance with their validly issued orders. Since the district court
had authority to issue the order allowing law enforcement officers to employ a
165. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
166. Illinois Bell was apparently motivated to object by fear of resulting civil and criminal
liability when the subscriber learned of the company's assistance. 531 F.2d at 814. The company
feared liability would be grounded on the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605
(1970). The court held that such a disclosure would be "on demand of lawful authority" within §
605(6). See United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 943 (7th Cir. 1974). Further, the cases have held
that § 605 does not prohibit the use of a pen register. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d
478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975). See generally Note, The Legal
Constraints Upon the Use of a Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
1038 (1975).
Illinois Bell was also concerned that cooperation would render them liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. The court held that a valid order from the district court could be
interjected as a defense to these actions. 531 F.2d at 814-15.
167. 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Application I].
168. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211(b), 84 Stat. 654 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970)).
169. 531 F.2d at 814.
170. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211(b), 84 Stat. 654, (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970)).
171. 531 F.2d at 814.
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pen register, the All Writs Act further granted such authority. 17 2 The
telephone company could not be held criminally or civilly liable since it was
acting "on demand of a lawful authority.''73
The Second Circuit has held that assuming a district court has the
authority to issue such orders, it is an abuse of the court's discretion to do so.
The court considered the issue in the second Application of the United
States. 174 Resolution of the question turned on two problems: (1) whether the
district court erred in authorizing the use of the pen register, and (2) whether it
erred in ordering the communications carrier to provide assistance.
Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the court found that a district court is
vested with the power to authorize the use of such a device. Although pen
registers were not covered by title HI, the court's inherent authority or power
which was a "logical derivative" of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were ample sources of such power. 175 This power, of course, was
subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment.
The court did not expressly decide the issue of whether there was
authority to order a private communications carrier to furnish technical
assistance. The government argued that the All Writs Act 176 provided
sufficient grounds for such authorization, citing Illinois Bell. The exercise of
inherent judicial authority or powers under the All Writs Act was entirely
permissive in nature. Assuming (without expressly deciding) that the court
had such discretionary power, the Second Circuit found that it was an abuse of
discretion to issue the order.'
77
The court balanced the policy considerations. Aside from the immediate
impact on the telephone company, the court was concerned with the "broader
implications regarding the power of a federal court to mandate law enforce-
ment assistance by private citizens and corporations under the threat of the
contempt sanction. " 178 Absent technical aid from such bodies, an order
authorizing use of a pen register would be worthless. Further, the implemen-
tation of such a device requires no extraordinary effort or time. Nor was there
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic-
tions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
173. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
174. 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976), rehearing granted, (August 31, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Application Il].
175. Id. at 960. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. "While the electronic impulses recorded by pen
registers are not 'property' in the strict sense of that term as it is used in Rule 41(b), we concur in
the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that there exists a power akin to that lodged in Rule 41 to order
the seizure of non-tangible property." 538 F.2d at 959.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
177. 538 F.2d at 961.
178. 538 F.2d at 960.
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any risk of civil or criminal liability in complying with such an order.' 79
Failure to issue such an order could severely hamper law enforcement.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation
that Congress' swift action after Application I in amending title III indicated
its belief that the court had inherent authority to issue such orders. It was more
likely that Congress' action was due to a doubt that such authority existed.
Regardless of the inference drawn, a reasonable conclusion was that similar
authorization should be required in connection with pen registers. One of the
most important factors in considering the issue was the possibility that the
order would establish authority for "federal courts to impress unwilling aid
on private third parties,"' 80 absent any mandate from Congress. The court
was required to consider the privacy rights of third parties so that they might
be protected from overzealous governmental activity. On the balance, policy
considerations weighed in favor of preventing such orders in the absence of
congressional authority.
Judge Mansfield, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Applica-
tion II, offered the most cogent analysis of the problem. He agreed with the
majority's holding that the district court had the power to issue such an order,
but disagreed that it was an abuse of the court's discretion to order the
telephone company to assist in its installation. The All Writs Act, though it
does not establish jurisdiction, authorizes issuance of auxiliary orders consist-
ent with existent jurisdiction. 8' The use of the Act was no more novel in this
area than in any other. 182
It was not an abuse of discretion to direct that such assistance be
rendered. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to effectuate the court's
order without the cooperation of the phone company. Such cooperation was
neither burdensome nor expensive.
Judge Mansfield pointed out what this author feels is the most important
consideration which was not discussed in the other opinions concerned with
this issue: "[T]he intrusion into the privacy of the targets of the surveillance
and their communications was less than would have occured had the govern-
ment sought authorization of a Title III wiretap; only the destination, not the
content, of telephone messages was to be monitored.' ' 83 As he noted, the
paradoxical result of the court's holding will be to increase the number of
wiretaps and maximize governmental intrusion of privacy.' 84
179. Id.
180. Id. at 962.
181. Id. at 963. See, e.g., Covington & Cincinnatti Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U.S. 109 (1906).
182. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
954 (1971) (order requiring parents to send son to a particular school); Application of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (order requiring blood
transfusion).
183. 538 F.2d at 964.
184. Id. at n.1.
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The majority opinion is weak on a number of grounds. Its belief in the
purpose of the rapid amendment to title III in 1970 is unfounded. "The
Supreme Court has long cautioned against drawing the inference that an
express Congressional grant of authority to an agency necessarily implies that
the agency previously lacked such authority. "1 85 Thus, the need for congres-
sional approval in the pen register area does not necessarily follow. The
majority's fear of establishing a dangerous precedent for law enforcement
personnel to progressively deiand more assistance from third parties to aid in
investigation was not a reasonable one. All Writs' powers are limited to cases
of clear necessity. District court judges have traditionally had broad powers to
issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. Thus, they
are fully capable of employing sensible standards in deciding whether other
forms of relief should be granted under the Act.
Nor could Judge Manfield agree that Congress was in a better position,
as opposed to the district courts, to define under what circumstances aid can
be mandated. The Congress did not do so in title 111. 186 Further, there was no
basis to believe that federal law enforcement would make such demands
outside such areas. In any case, a court is in a much better position to
determine whether such orders should issue since it is able to consider the
circumstances of the individual case.
The Seventh Circuit and Judge Mansfield have adopted the better view.
In such cases, there is a clear necessity for assistance from the private
communications carrier. There are minimal burdens on the communications
carrier and no risk of civil or criminal liability. Since there is a real risk that the
government might be compelled to intrude to a greater extent into privacy by
applying wiretaps (the installation of which can be compelled by title III), 187 a
district court will clearly be within its discretion in issuing such an order. The
government has applied for a rehearing in Application I1. Whether or not
there is an actual need for congressional enactment to clarify the issue is yet to
be determined.188
185. 538 F.2d at 964; see Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47 (1950): "we will not
draw the inference . . . that an agency admits that it is acting upon a wrong construction by
seeking ratification from Congress. Public policy requires that agencies feel free to ask for
legislation which will terminate or avoid adverse contentions and litigations."
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
187. The majority in Application II states specifically, however, that the Congress must
decide the issue by some form of legislation. 538 F.2d at 963.
188. In Application of the United States, 407 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Mo. 1976), the court held
that it did not have jurisdiction to authorize the use of a pen register absent a proper application
under title III. The court held that title III is broad enough to encompass a pen register.
Contending that both the legislative history and the commentators were unclear or inaccurate, the
court held "it is clear that the language of Title III comprehends all forms of electronic
surveillance, and the orders which the government seeks cannot be obtained independent of
procedures contained therein." Id. at 407.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 337
Two cases involving title III which deserve comment were decided in the
last year. The cases elucidate some of the enunciated policies for the title's
adoption. Before embarking on a discussion of them, a few general remarks
should be made about the wiretap statute.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968189
contains a comprehensive scheme regulating wiretapping as well as prohibi-
tions against other forms of electronic surveillance. 90 Evidence obtained in
violation of the title is inadmissible in any state or federal proceeding. 19'
There are two exceptions to its broad strictures. Interceptions procured
following proper application to the Attorney General or his designated
assistant and pursuant to a court order are admissible.' 92 Any interception
obtained with the consent of one party is also excepted. 193
In order to intercept an oral or wire communication without the consent
of one of the parties, a two-step procedure must be followed under the title.
Authorization must be obtained from the Attorney General or "any assistant
Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General." 194 Follow-
ing authorization by the Attorney General or his assistant, a court of
competent jurisdiction must approve the wiretap. 95 The application to the
court must specifically statethe nature of the offense being investigated and
the investigative need justifying the use of the surveillance, as well as
sufficient information for making a probable cause determination.1 96
Two cases, United States v. Brodson1 9' and United States ex rel. Machi v.
United States Department of Probation ,198 which were decided last year by
the Seventh Circuit, involve procedural aspects of the federal wiretap laws. In
Machi, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that the
wiretap evidence had not been obtained with the proper authorization of the
189. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
190. Title III was enacted to conform with principles laid down in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), which held that the fourth amendment protects a person's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. The focus therefore is not on whether the invasion amounted to a physical
trespass. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2(1968); Blakely & Hancock, A Proposed
Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 657,658-59(1968). As a result the title
has been upheld on constitutional grounds. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 771-75 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
192. Id. § 2517(3).
193. Id. §§ 2511(2)(c), (d). For a recent case in the Seventh Circuit involving consensual
interception, see United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975). In Bastone, the
defendant moved to suppress five phone conversations he had with the chief prosecution witness
which were recorded. The fact that the witness was motivated to consent to the recordings by the
desire to make a better deal with the government did not vitiate the consent.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
195. Id. § 2518.
196. Id. § 2518(1).
197. 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1975).
198. 536 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Attorney General or his specially-designated assistant. The government
introduced evidence that the executive assistant to the Attorney General had a
telephone conversation with him in which he approved the application. The
petitioner alleged that the Attorney General needed more "basic information
and unscreened data in order for him to make an independent judgment
concerning the wisdom of seeking a wiretap order."199
After finding the petitioner could proceed under the federal habeas
corpus statute, 200 the court considered the only other issue: the validity of the
wiretap authorization. The court noted that guidelines for what constituted
proper authorization were set out in United States v. Giordano20 1 and United
States v. Chavez .202 Giordano held that evidence obtained through wiretap
authorizations where the application was approved by the Attorney General's
executive assistant without approval by the Attorney General himself must be
suppressed. Chavez held that misidentification of the officer giving the
authorization on the court order was insufficient to justify suppression (when
in fact the Attorney General had given his approval).
In Machi the court held the affidavit to be sufficient proof of personal
participation of the Attorney General in the approval process. The court noted
that "in all cases considering the problem, the basic inquiry has been whether
the Attorney General or his designated Assistant Attorney General actually
approved the application or whether someone not authorized to issue an
approval made the final decision.' '203
Machi reflects judicial recognition of the purposes for which the
procedural aspects of the title were adopted. Implicit in Machi is the
continuing expression of a judicial desire to assure a responsible executive
determination of the need for each interception. 2' The scope of the inquiry
should therefore be limited to a determination of whether in fact the Attorney
General or his designated assistant approved the order. Further, the case
reflects the judicial recognition of Congress' desire to limit the authority to
make such approvals. 205 This limitation centralizes power and prevents the
possibility of divergent application and avoidance of responsibility. 206 Where
199. Id. at 181. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
201. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
202. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
203. 536 F.2d at 184. The court noted that neither the statute nor the cases have required the
Attorney General to make a totally independent probable cause determination in order to
conform with the requirements of the act. See United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1975).
204. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505-15 (1974).
205. Id. at 516-23.
206. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1968):
Paragraph (1) provides that the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General of the Department of Justice specifically designated by him, may authorize an
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it is impracticable to obtain such approval, Congress clearly anticipated that
such evidence would be lost. 207
United States v. Brodson20 8 involved a government failure to seek court
authorization for a wiretap. The government initially applied for and received
authorization for a wiretap on an alleged operation of an illegal gambling
business in interstate commerce. 209 On the basis of wiretap information, the
defendant was subsequently charged with the transmission of wagers and
wagering information in interstate commerce, a distinct and separate of-
fense. 210 Under title III, the government is required to immediately file a
renewed application if investigators have cause to believe that another
designated crime is being committed. 211 In Brodson, the government did not
file its application until eight months after the indictment was returned,
shortly before trial. The district court dismissed the indictment. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed and held that a second application was required. The court
emphasized governmental compliance with the strictures of the statute in
rebutting the government's argument that the intercepted conversations
which related to section 1955 also related to section 1084 and that therefore it
was not necessary to renew the application. 212 "The controlling factor here,
however, is not the dissimilarity of the offenses, but the fact that the
Government itself has violated the key provision of the legislative scheme of
Section 2515, in that it did not comply with the mandate of Section
2517(5).' '213
application for an order authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications.
This provision centralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the political
process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance
techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility that divergent practices might
develop. Should abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person.
This provision in itself should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses will
happen.
207. See Hearings on Anti-Crime Program before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., I st Sess. 1379 (1967) (Remarks of Professor Blakely, the bill's drafter).
208. 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1975).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
210. Id. § 1084.
211. Id. § 2517(5).
212. 528 F.2d at 216.
213. Id. See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1968):
Paragraph (5) provides that if an investigative or law enforcement officer, while
engaged in intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized in the
chapter, intercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those
specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence
derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of
this section, discussed above. Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom may
be introduced in evidence under subsection (3) of this section only when authorized or
approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction as defined in section 2510(9) where such
judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. They need not be designated "of-
fenses." Such subsequent application would include a showing that the original order
was lawfully obtained, that it was sought in good faith and not as subterfuge search,




The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals this year reiterated its support for
the "restrictive" interpretation of discovery rules in criminal cases. In United
States v. Callahan ,214 the court considered whether oral statements in the
nature of confessions or admissions, made by a defendant to a prospective
government witness, first memorialized in the recollection of that witness and
later transcribed are discoverable prior to trial. The decision turned on the
interplay between the federal discovery rule, rule 16,215 and the Jencks Act.2 16
The court applied the rationale previously articulated in United States v.
Feinberg217 and rejected the defendant's argument that Feinberg was not
controlling because Feinberg was concerned with mere statements of a
defendant rather than statements in the nature of confessions or admissions. 218
Both Feinberg219 and Callahan22 express sympathy for the general
principle of broader discovery in criminal cases. However, they find that the
interpretation of the interplay between rule 16 and the Jencks Act urged by the
defendants would require legislation "by judicial fiat." 221
The divergence of opinion on this issue turns on whether the statements
214. 534 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. June 11, 1976)
(No. 75-1800).
215. FED, R. CRIM. P. 16.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
217. 502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975). For discussions of
Feinberg, see Haddad, supra note 6, at 305 and Comment, Criminal Disco very-United States v.
Feinberg, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 633 (1974).
218. United States v. Callahan, 74 CR 512 (N.D. Ill., filed June 30, 1975). The argument.was
set forth by the court as follows:
It should be noted that Feinberg does not deal with confessions as such, but with
statements of the defendant. Given the significance, as hereinafter discussed, of
confessions or acknolwedgements of guilt, we do not believe that the Seventh Circuit
intended per curiam to hold that any such confession or acknolwedgment of guilt made
orally to a prospective government witness, whether government agent or not, is not
discoverable by a defendant until after the witness has testified even though the
confession is specifically set forth in a written statement of the prospective govern-
ment witness made after conferring with the defendant.
Such a holding would mean that no confession or acknowledgement of guilt would
ever be discoverable before trial by a defendant unless it was in a separate document
signed or acknowledged by the defendant and not incorporated in any statement of a
possible government witness. There is nothing in the language or history of Rule 16 to
indicate that only confessions written or signed by the defendant are discoverable and
that any confession made orally and incorporated in a statement of a government agent
or other prospective witness may be hidden by the prosecution until after the witness
has testified. Yet this is what the government would have us read Feinberg to hold.
This may be a slight over-statement since the government apparently concedes
that a confession or acknowledgment of guilt made to a government agent who is a
prospective witness is discoverable under Rule 16 if incorporated in the agent's written
report. Feinberg, on the other hand, makes no distinction between prospective
witnesses who are.government agents and those who are not. If Feinberg is applicable
to confessions, they are not discoverable if contained in a prospective witness' written
statement whether or not such witness is a government agent.
219. 502 F.2d at 1182.
220. 534 F.2d at 765.
221. 534 F.2d at 766. See also 502 F.2d at 1183.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 341
sought to be discovered are statements of the defendant as described in rule
16(a)(1)222 or statements of the witness as described in the Jencks Act. 223 The
Seventh Circuit's view is that a defendant's statements are discoverable if
they are written or recorded at the time they were made, or if a written account
was contemplated, when the statement was made and it is later committed to
writing. 224 However, if the statement is first memorialized only in a witness'
recollection, it is not discoverable. 225 In the latter case, pretrial discovery is
precluded by the Jencks Act 226 because it is impossible to reveal the "contents
and circumstances of a defendant's statement without revealing the contents
of the prospective witness' statement . . 227
The arguments in favor of discovery of such statements were most
eloquently and persuasively propounded by a district judge in the Northern
District of Illinois. 228 In a lengthy opinion Judge Marshall set forth his opinion
that rule 16 "contemplates discretionary pretrial disclosure of a defendant's
statements to third parties who are not government agents regardless of how
the statement has been recorded.' '229 The probative value of the statement is
that it comes from the defendant. The fact that a third party is interposed
between the defendant and the government should not affect the right of the
defendant to discover the statement. 23° The Seventh Circuit, however, does
not agree.
222. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1):
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government
to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (1) written or
recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within
the possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known,
or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the
government.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) provides:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness
or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of
subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examina-
tion in the trial of the case.
224. 502 F.2d at 1183.
225. Id.
226. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
227. 502 F.2d at 1183. This same approach has been taken by other courts. See United States
v. Walk, 533 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1975) (but see the dissenting opinion in Walk, 533 F.2d at 420,
which finds the district court decision in Feinberg, 371 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1974) persuasive);
United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Wilkerson, 456 F.2d 57 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 926 (1972); United States v. Dorfman, 53 F.R.D. 477 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1972).
228. United States v. Feinberg, 371 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
229. Id. at 1212.
230. Id. at 1212-13. In the district court opinion in Callahan, Judge Will distinguished
Feinberg, as noted in note 218, supra. In addition to generally approving the broad criminal
discovery advocated by Judge Marshall in Feinberg, Judge Will set forth in detail an additional
reason why special sensitivity should be shown towards the needs of defendants to obtain
confessions or admissions. He argued that one result of the production of such statements would
be an increased number of guilty pleas, stating:
Examination of Rule 16, we believe, makes clear that the draftsmen were
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The amendments to rule 16231 make the Feinberg-Callahan rule one of
limited applicability 232 because the statement is not discoverable if the
defendant does not know that the person he is making a statement to is a
government agent. 233 The rule of the Seventh Circuit is clear, despite the
dissatisfaction with it expressed by district court judges.
The court decided two other cases which summarily rejected claims by
defendants for discovery. In United States v. Cook,234 the district court
denied a defense request for case reports of a governmental agency, sum-
maries of an investigation and a list of government witnesses.235 The Seventh
Circuit upheld the denial as being within the trial court's discretion since the
disclosure was not required by statute or by rule. 236 United States v.
cognizant of the importance to defendants and their counsel of knowledge that the
government possessed information which constitutes a confession of guilt and that
disclosure in advance of trial would frequently be necessary to enable defense counsel
to investigate the matter and determine what action to take under the circumstances.
Such action may not only involve preparing to meet the purported confession at trial,
but, more frequently, to consider whether the client's best interests may not be better
served by a guilty plea rather than a trial.
Other cases also support this interpretation of rule 16. See United States v. Percevault, 490
F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Crisona, 416 F.2d 107, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. De Lyra v. United States, 397
U.S. 961 (1970).
231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A), as amended, reads:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the govern-
ment, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become
known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral statement which
the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether
before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known to the
defendant to be a government agent .....
232. See Haddad, supra note 6, at 303-04; United States v. Callahan, 534 F.2d 763, 765 n.2
(7th Cir. 1976).
233. This new provision was viewed by the court in United States v. Walk, 533 F.2d 417 (9th
Cir. 1975), as support for its refusal to require production of defendants' statements to third party
non-government agents. Because the rules were designed to broaden criminal discovery, the
addition of the provision for production of oral statements to government agents indicates that
Congress did not believe such statements were covered previously. Thus the provision was
necessary. Had Congress intended that all oral statements of defendants be producible, the
provision would have included such statements. This would seem to be the rationale behind the
court's statements that if "the defendant's view of the current Rule 16(a)(l) were proper, the
Amendment would be either unnecessary or, if necessary, too narrowly drawn." Id. at 418 n.8.
The Walk court further noted its belief that the amendments to Rule 16 would have no
material effect on the result of that case. 533 F.2d at 418 n.l.
The author wishes to point out that despite the fact that the trial court ruling in Callahan was
based on the old version of rule 16 (a)(l), the petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in
Callahan states the issue presented in the case as whether 18 U.S.C. § 3500 operates as a
limitation on rule 16 (a)(l)(A), the new rule 16, under the circumstances presented in Callahan.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, United States v. Callahan, 534 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1976). This
apparent interchange of the new rule's language for the old would indicate that it is not seen as
material whether the Court's ruling is based on the old or the new rule.
234. 530 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1976).
235. Id. at 151.
236. Id. at 152. This ruling is consistent with that in United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001
(7th Cir. 1975). Unfortunately, this decision did not provide any additional insight into the view of
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Williams237 rejected a "frivolous" defense claim of prejudice because of the
refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance so that section 3500 material
could be examined.238
OTHER PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Two statutes provide for possible ways for a party to obtain a change of
an assigned trial judge. The first statute239 outlines a procedure by which the
party can file an affidavit alleging personal bias or prejudice of a judge. The
second statute24° requires mandatory disqualification on the judge's initiative
the court on what circumstances might warrant the exercise of discretion in favor of discovery of
witness lists.
237. 536 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1976).
238. Id. at 1204-05. Although this article is confined primarily to a discussion of Seventh
Circuit decisions, it must be pointed out that the United States Supreme Court decision in
Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976), is an important one for any attorney working in the
federal criminal courts. The Court, in a unanimous decision, held that
a writing prepared by a Government lawyer relating to the subject matter of the
testimony of a Government witness that has been "signed or otherwise approved" by
the Government witness is producible under the Jencks Act, and is not rendered
non-producible because a Government lawyer interviews the witness and writes the
statement.
Id. at 98.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970) provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the
term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to
file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
240. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. IV 1974) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970)) reads:
(a) Any justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director,
or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
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under given circumstances. This latter provision was recently amended2 41 to
broaden its applicability and more specifically define the circumstances under
which the judge must recuse himself.
The Seventh Circuit decided several cases last year concerning both
statutes. United States v. Jeffers242 carefully considered a motion for change
of judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144.2421 Jeffers was one in a series of cases
heard by the Seventh Circuit243 involving a large narcotics ring. The same trial
judge heard all the cases, which involved many of the same defendants. In this
unusual situation the Seventh Circuit refused to require a change of judge
where no personal, as opposed to judicial, bias was shown. 2 " All that was
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial
interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the
meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other states
of litigation;(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator,
trustee, and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active partici-
pant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless
the judge participates in the management of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal,
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by
the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insur-
ance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a
similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organiza-
tion only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect
the value of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial inter-
est" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could
substantially affect the value of the securities.
(e) No justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy shall accept from the
parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in
subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a),
waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the
basis for disqualification.
Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1,88 Stat. 1609 (amending 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970)), see
note 240, supra.
241. The previous section read simply:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material
witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974).
242. 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 55 (1976).
242.1. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
243. The most recent in the series is United States v. Harris, No. 74 CR 143 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
12, 1976). The others are United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.) cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
55 (1976); United States v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jeffers, 520
F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-482).
244. 532 F.2d at 1112.
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alleged in Jeffers was prior judicial action by the trial judge from which no
personal bias could be inferred.24 5
Barry v. United States246 rejected a claim that the trial judge should have
recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455.247 Because the opinion is primarily
concerned with the construction of language in the prior version of the statute,
its applicability is limited. However, the careful analysis of the basic
principles involved in such a case and the extensive research noted in the
opinion do provide a useful tool.24 8
One other case dealing with pretrial proceedings requires brief mention
here. 249 The defendant in United States v. Cowsen250 alleged that the four-and-
one-half-month delay between his arrest and indictment on a narcotics offense
was unreasonable. He relied on a series of cases from the District of Columbia
Circuit which have required a "detailed judicial exploration of the underlying
reasons" for delays in excess of four months between detection of a narcotics
offense and notice to the accused. 251 The Seventh Circuit delined to follow the
245. Id. The court stated:
All the defendant alleged in this case was prior judicial actions on the part of Judge
Sharp. If from these we infer that Judge Sharp developed personal bias towards the
defendant, we are overlooking the basic presumption that a judge approaches each
new case with impartiality and conducts the case on its own merits from the evidence
there presented quite apart from any other case he might have heard. If the rule were
otherwise, the Family [the name of the narcotics ring of which defendant was a
member] would long ago have run through the judges in Indiana and possibly in all of
the Seventh Circuit.
246. 528 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1976).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
248. The court also rejected the contention tjhat defendant had waived his § 455 objections,
thereby adopting the view that a waiver of such objection was precluded by an earlier amendment
to the statute. This had been the view of only one other court. See United States v. Amerine, 411
F.2d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1969). The Seventh Circuit found this the more informed view. 538 F.2d
at 1097-98 n.7. The waiver issue has also been settled by the new statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)
(Supp. IV 1974) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970)). See the text of the statute quoted at note 240,
supra.
249. Four additional cases involving other pretrial proceedings were considered. Two of
them, United States v. Grose, 525 F.2d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1477
(1976), and United States v. Buchanan, 529 F.2d 1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1725 (1976), rejected challenges to jury arrays on constitutional grounds. In neither case was
there an allegation of a purposeful, deliberate or systematic exclusion of a particular group of
people. Thus, under Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972), and Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965), no proper grounds were alleged for a successful attack on the jury venire
or jury array.
In United States v. Gilpin, 542 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976), the enforcement of an Internal
Revenue Service summons was upheld on the factual finding that the issuance of the summons
was part of an ongoing investigation and was therefore not prohibited by 26 U.S.C. § 7605(b)
(1970).
United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1682 (1976),
held that a 27 month delay between defendant's arrest and trial required a consideration of the
factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); namely, the length of the delay, the reason
for the delay, the assertion of the right to speedy trial and prejudice to the defendant. 526 F.2d at
187 n.2. On the facts, the court found that the reasons were sufficient.
250. 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2227 (1976).
251. See Robinson v. United States, 450 F.2d 847, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and cases cited
therein.
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lead of the District of Columbia Circuit in establishing a different rule in
narcotics cases than in other delay cases. On the facts of Cowsen, the court
found no evidence that the government intentionally delayed charging the
defendant either for tactical advantage or purposes of harassment. 252 On the
contrary, because the investigation was ongoing, an indictment might have
adversely affected its progress and jeopardized the safety of law enforcement
officers.25 3 Therefore, the delay was justified.
JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
Joinder and severance of defendants and offenses are governed by two
rules. The criteria for joinder of offenses against a single defendant is stated in
rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." 4 Rule 8(b)255 details the
circumstances under which two or more defendants may be jointly charged in
a single indictment. Allegations that joinder is improper under rule 8 must
ordinarily be raised by way of a pre-trial motion under rule 12.256 Where
joinder is proper under rule 8 but the contention is that trial of the case so
joined will be prejudicial, rule 14 allows for relief as may be required to
protect the parties. 2
57
To justify severance under rule 14, the defendant must make a strong
showing2 8 that actual prejudice will result from a joint trial with the
252. 530 F.2d at 737.
253. Id.
254. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a):
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-
meanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan.
255. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b):
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series
of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not
be charged in each count.
256. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2):
Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in
the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or
to charge an offense may be raised only by motion before trial. The motion shall
include all such defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to
present any such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof,
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or
the failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense shall be noticed by the
court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.
257. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance
of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by
a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to
deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by
the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
258. United States v. Rajewski, 526 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1975).
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codefendants or on the multiple counts challenged.259 A defendant makes a
showing of actual prejudice when he demonstrates that without a severance a
fair trial cannot be obtained. 26 The most frequent claims of prejudice are that
if joinder is allowed codefendants will refuse to testify at trial, 261 a codefend-
ant's confession will inculpate the defendant, 262 and that a codefendant will
assert an inconsistent defense. 263
Although the issue of prejudicial joinder of defendants is raised in almost
every criminal trial involving multiple defendants or multiple counts, the
challenge is rarely successful. 264 The Seventh Circuit's observation that
reversals for failure to sever are almost non-existent 265 remains an accurate
statement. Challenges to joinder in the past year were based on allegations
that a joint trial would deny defendants the opportunity to call codefendants as
witnesses, 266 on the apprehension that testimony as to one count would have a
prejudicial influence on the jury's consideration of a second count,2 67 and on
the theory that because the defendant would be forced to choose between
testifying on both counts of an indictment or not at all, his fifth amendment
rights would be abridged.268 All of these challenges were rejected.
In construing questions of joinder and severance this past term, the
Seventh Circuit relied on its decisions in two prior cases. In the first case,
United States v. Echeles,269 where the sole codefendant could give a
"dramatic and convincing exculpation" of the defendant, the court ruled that
a single joint trial of several defendants could not be had at the expense of one
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial. 270 United States v. Pacente
held that joinder of an extortion count and a perjury count arising out of the
defendant's grand jury testimony concerning the substantive count was not so
prejudicial that jury instructions would be ineffective in protecting the
defendant. 27 1
259. United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737, 743 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976).
260. United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Blue, 440 F.2d
300, 302 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 838 (7th Cir. 1967).
261. United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976).
262. See United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968).
263. See Circuit Courts Note: Criminal, 64 GEO. L.J. 167, 276 (1975).
264. See Haddad, supra note 6, at 306.
265. See United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1106 (7th Cir. 1975). In most cases the
denial of the motion for severance based on prejudice is so routine that almost no discussion is
engaged in by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737, 743 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Crouch, 528 F.2d
625, 632 (7th Cir. 1976).
266. United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976).
267. United States v. Rajewski, 526 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1976).
268. Holmes v. Gray, 526 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Abraham, 541
F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976), where one defendant filed an affidavit to the effect that he would be
willing to testify for all defendants that particular transactions never took place if the trials were
held separately, but not in the event of a joint trial.
269. 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965).
270. Id. at 898.
271. 503 F.2d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'g 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1048 (1974).
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In United States v. Rajewski ,272 decided this past term, the court rejected
the defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the denial of separate trials on
an obstruction of justice count and a count of submitting false documents to a
government agency. At Rajewski's trial, two witnesses admitted that tes-
timony they had given to the grand jury favorable to the defendant was untrue.
Defendant reasoned that because the witnesses admitted lying to the grand
jury, the petit jurors were predisposed to believe them and reject his defense
because the grand jury had rejected the witness' testimony by returning an
indictment. 273 Therefore, two reasons for substantial prejudice were alleged.
First, it was argued that the testimony on the obstruction of justice charge
would taint the consideration of the substantive count. Second, the joinder
caused actual confusion for the jury which was not remedied by the judge's
instructions. 274
A careful analysis of the cases relied on by Rajewski 275 and considera-
tion of the facts of the case led the court to reject the claim of prejudice. Here,
unlike Pacente, the defendant's credibility was not in issue. The fact that the
two witnesses for the government admitted lying to the grand jury offered the
defense the opportunity to attack their veracity. 27 6 These facts, combined with
the court's opinion that the challenged testimony was admissible on all
counts, resulted in its finding that any "spillover" effect was minimal.277
Therefore, the defendant had not met his burden of demonstrating the
existence of prejudice affecting substantial rights.
In Holmes v. Gray,278 a state prisoner brought a habeas corpus action
alleging violation of his fifth amendment rights in the consolidation of armed
robbery and attempted murder offenses. 279 Holmes stated that he had desired
to testify about the attempted murder charge but to remain silent on the armed
robbery charge. Forcing him to choose between testifying to both charges or
272. 526 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1975).
273. Id. at 152.
274. Id.
275. Rajewski argued that United States v. Quinn, 365 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966), Flores v.
United States, 379 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1967), and the en banc opinion in United States v. Pacente,
503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974), presented support for his theory. The
court easily distinguished the first two cases on factual distinctions. The analysis of Pacente
concluded that
it was conceivable that "a trial juror may be influenced in deciding to believe a
witness' testimony by the fact that the grand jurors heard the same testimony and did
not believe it". . . [but] it was an unwarranted over-refinement to speculate that trial
jurors would fail to decide the issues of fact according to their own proper evaluation of
the evidence.
526 F.2d at 154.
276. 526 F.2d at 154.
277. Id. at 155.
278. 526 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1975).
279. The Wisconsin statute regarding joinder and severance, Wis. STAT. § 971.12(1),(3)
(1969) (reproduced in the opinion, 526 F.2d at 624), was so similar to the federal statute, FED. R.
CRIM. P. 8(a) and 14, that the court applied federal standards in analyzing the case.
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not at all was an impermissible burden on his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.
The court first held that the joinder of the two offenses was proper
because they arose from two closely connected transactions. 280 The more
difficult question was whether the joinder was sufficiently prejudicial to
require severance. In rejecting the claim of prejudice the court impliedly
applied a standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit: "Prejudice may develop when an accused wishes to testify
on one but not the other of two joined offenses which are clearly distinct in
time, place and evidence. , 281 The Seventh Circuit interpreted this statement
as requiring that the different offenses be distinct as to the three factors-
time, place and evidence. 282 These standards were not met in Holmes because
the events involved took place within a twenty minute time period.283
The real difficulty with defendant's position was that evidence of each of
the crimes charged would have been admissible at separate trials for the
individual offenses. 284 In such cases "the possibility of 'criminal propensity'
prejudice would be in no way enlarged by the fact of joinder.' '285 The claim of
substantial prejudice in such instances is meritless. Thus, where joinder is
proper and no substantial prejudicial effect is present, the fifth amendment is
not violated because an election must be made to testify to both charges or
none at all.286
In United States v. Abraham ,287 a motion for severance was supported
by an affidavit from one of the defendants, stating that he would testify on
behalf of all the defendants that certain crucial meetings did not occur as
described by the chief government witness. At the time the defendant made
his desire to testify known, the court ruled that the government would be
permitted to cross-examine the witness concerning prior acts of misconduct to
demonstrate his intent and state of mind. The court distinguished Echeles on
the grounds that the testimony of the defendant in Abraham would merely
counter details of the government's proof and would not completely exculpate
280. 526 F.2d at 625.
281. Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987,989 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Cross was criticized because
the standards set forth there are difficult to apply before trial. Note, Joint and Single Trials Under
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 560 (1965).
282. 526 F.2d at 626.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 625 (quoting Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (9th Cir. 1954)).
286. Id. at 626. The court cited the logic of Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970), as
being applicable to this situation:
The defendant in a criminal trial is frequently forced to testify himself and to call other
witnesses in an effort to reduce the risk of conviction. . . .That the defendant faces
such a dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a
defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.
287. 541 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the other defendants. Because the offered testimony would only cast doubt on
part of the government's proof, no substantial prejudice was shown.
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In the past year, the Seventh Circuit continued to follow the standard for
effective assistance of counsel announced in United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey. 288 In Williams, the court held that a defendant had been denied such
assistance where counsel had not met "a minimal standard of professional
representation.''289 The cases dealing with such issues were dealt with
summarily by the court.
290
The most significant case in the conflict of interest area was United
States v. Gaines. 291 Gaines focused on the burden of disclosure of a conflict
of interest adopted in United States v. Mandell.292 Mandell held that a trial
court was under no duty to admonish a defendant of the dangers of multiple
representation when they appear in court represented by a single attorney.
293
The trial court, however, does have an obligation to be alert for conflicts at all
stages of the proceedings. When a possibility of such conflict appears, the
trial court is obliged to investigate it and advise the defendant. This obligation
to investigate and advise is incumbent on the court only when it observes
"indicia of conflict." The primary responsibility for ascertainment and
avoidance of such conflict situations lies with the defendant's lawyer.
In Gaines, three defendants were charged with robbing an armored truck
and murdering the driver. Upon arrest, defendant Gaines confessed, implicat-
288. 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975).
289. Id. at 640.
290. See United States v. Chausee, 536 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1976) (nothing in record to suggest
lack of experience or ability of trial counsel sufficient to meet Williams test); Faulisi v. Daggett,
527 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1975) (inadequacy of counsel allegation not supported by the record).
A case which deserves some note, however, is United States v. Merritt, 528 F.2d 650 (7th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam), in which the court held that "[u~nder all the circumstances of the case,"
the Williams standard had not been met. Id. at 651. Counsel had failed the Indiana bar
examination three times and had no previous experience trying cases. He was a member of the
Iowa bar. Judge Sharp, the trial judge, deemed counsel's performance adequate. The Seventh
Circuit held, however, that the effect of counsel's inexperience and exam failures "compounded
by the cumulative effect of several incidents which provide reasonable grounds for questioning
counsel's professional judgment and skill" created an appearance of inadequacy. Id. at 651.
291. 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976).
292. 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 774 (1976). In Mandell, the court
refused to adopt the District of Columbia Circuit rule that requires the trial court judge to
investigate and admonish defendants concerning the dangers of multiple representation. See
Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243,245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Mandell court held that neither
the sixth amendment, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), nor any other United States
Supreme Court case mandated the District of Columbia Circuit's requirement.
293. This "pretrial cross examination" of defense counsel is objectionable in two senses: (1)
nothing justifies the presumption that counsel will not be loyal to the defendant's interest; and (2)
the defendant will be prejudiced on appeal if the trial court has made a finding of no prejudice.
See United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930,932-33 (2d Cir.) (Moore, J.), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
935 (1966).
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ing two other men, who later became his codefendants. At his first trial,
Gaines was represented by the attorney who had initially represented his
codefendants in the case and who had also represented them on unrelated
felony charges in other jurisdictions. The codefendants were represented by
counsel who had initially representedall three defendants. During the trial,
Gaines repudiated his confession, a condensed version of which had been
introduced during the government's case in chief. The first trial ended in a
mistrial. At the second trial, Gaines did not testify and therefore, was
deprived of the opportunity to retract his statement. Even though Gaines'
attorney had withdrawn from representation of the other two defendants,
Judge Tone held that this was a clear case of conflict of interest. When counsel
initially undertook to represent Gaines, he was also defending the other two in
that case as well as other proceedings. The subsequent withdrawal did not
remove the conflict, since it continued to be counsel's duty to refrain from
taking action adverse to the defendants' interests.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. In so doing, the court stated that the trial
court must be alert for "indicia of conflict" during all stages of the
proceeding. When the possibility of conflict appears, the court must investi-
gate relevant facts and determine whether, absent waiver, continued repre-
sentation would violate defendant's sixth amendment rights. The court then
must inform the defendant so that he can make an informed judgment as to
whether he wishes to continue with counsel. Though Mandell declined to
adopt a rule which would reverse because the trial court judge did not
investigate and warn at -the outset, the trial court judge must still be alert for
such conflict and must inform a defendant as soon as possible. 294 Though the
attorney has primary responsibility to warn his client of possible conflict, the
trial court shares this responsibility. Moreover, this responsibility begins
before trial: "While the court's failure to initially warn the defendants is not
itself error, it is apparent that the administration of criminal justice will be
better served if possible conflicts can be discovered and dealt with before trial
to avoid the risk of a mistrial."'295
Gaines is significant since it clearly states the role of the trial court
judge. Though responsibility lies with defense counsel to discover and inform
the client of such conflicts, the trial court has a clear and immediate
responsibility where a possibility of prejudice occurs. 296
294. 525 F.2d at 677; United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930,932-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 935 (1966). ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6.
In Mandell, the conflict was only potential or speculative but in Gaines, the court found that
it existed in fact.
295. 529 F.2d at 1045.
296. Another conflict of interest case was United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright,
525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1975). The defendant alleged that counsel was motivated to persuade the
defendant to enter a plea of guilty because it would have been more helpful to his other clients.
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In Massiah v. United States,297 the United States Supreme Court held
that the post-indictment admissions of a defendant to a government informant
in the absence of his retained counsel violated his rights under the sixth
amendment. The Court viewed the taking of such a statement as equivalent to
an interogation by law enforcement officers. In the last year, the Seventh
Circuit was asked in United States v. Merrit 298 to delimit the scope of the
right announced in Massiah.
The issue in Merritts was whether an admission, which independently
constituted a crime, made following a premature and faulty indictment would
be barred under a subsequent indictment for the same offense. The defendant
was initially indicted for causing the use of a facility in interstate commerce to
commit a crime of violence to further an unlawful bribery scheme. 299 In its
first indictment, the government failed to allege that an act in furtherance of
the scheme had been committed after the use of the interstate facility. Shortly
after his first indictment, the defendant attempted to solicit a bribe from a
government informant. During the conversation with the informant, he made
admissions concerning the crime for which he was then charged. The
government then superseded its indictment by alleging that the act "there-
after" was the attempted bribery.
The court initially noted that Massiah dealt with admissions of past
wrongdoings which themselves did not amount to criminal acts. Furthermore,
it was well settled that post-indictment utterances which amount to attempted
bribery or obstruction of justice would not be excluded under Massiah .30
The difference in Merritts was that the utterance was part of an incomplete
and prematurely charged crime as well as an independent offense. 30 1
Reversing as to the solicitation of the bribe, the court clearly stated that
the right announced in Massiah did not extend to the commission of new
crimes or the completion of an old one. Where incriminating statements about
Counsel, defendant contended, should have withdrawn from the case as soon as he determined
the interests of his other clients would have best been served by the defendant's guilty plea.
Based on the facts of the case, the court concluded that given the fact that counsel believed
the state had a written statement tantamount to a confession and that the defendant had no viable
defense, his good faith suggestion met the Williams standard. Noting that the primary responsi-
bility for discovery of conflicts lies with the bar, the court held that the defendant must
demonstrate "with a reasonable degree of specificity, that a conflict of interest actually existed at
trial." Id. at 994 (quoting United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 774 (1976)). Since he had not, the court affirmed.
297. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
298. 527 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1975).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
300. United States v. Osser, 483 F.2d 727, 730-34 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1098
(1973); United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 (4th Cir. 1969); Vinyard v. United States,
335 F.2d 176, 184-85 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964). See also Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966).
301. 527 F.2d at 716.
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past acts are obtained after indictment by some form of police interrogation,
the evidence should be excluded.3 °2 Judge Tone held, however, that Massiah
"does not confer immunity for utterances such as Merritts' solicitation of a
bribe, which are not statements of past conduct but constitutes criminal acts in
themselves.' '303
As the commentators have noted, the Massiah right is analogous to the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 3 4 Since the statement
was totally voluntary, Judge Tone's ruling was clearly correct. The court
should always be wary of limiting highly probative, reliable and relevant
evidence in the absence of some specific articulable prejudice to the defend-
ant.30 5 The result in Merritts reflects this concern and for that reason, the
opinion is extremely sound.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In the last year, the Seventh Circuit issued a series of opinions clarifying
its position on instructions for reasonable doubt as enunciated in United States
v. Lawson .36 In Lawson, the Seventh Circuit had held that a trial court judge
does not commit plain error in refusing to define "reasonable doubt" even
when a fair instruction had been tendered on that subject. The cases clarifying
this decision revolved around an instruction, LaBuy 6.01-3, which defines
reasonable doubt as "substantial rather than speculative.' '307
In United States v. Bridges308 the court held that the equation of
reasonable doubt with substantial doubt was erroneous. 3°9 A similar chal-
302. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 57 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Enker & Elsen]; Note, The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 217-23 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Term Note]. In
Massiah, the fact that the government was interrogating the defendant was crucial. The Court
equated the deliberate eliciting of a confession to coercive interrogation.
The district court found that since the second indictment did not charge an offense separate
and distinct from the offense charged in the first indictment, the sixth amendment right
demanded exclusion. 387 F. Supp. 807, 812 (E.D. Ill.), rev'd, 527 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1975).
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 208 (1964) (White, J. dissenting).
303. 527 F.2d at 716.
304. See Enker & Elsen, supra note 302, at 57; 1963 Term Note, supra note 302, at 219.
305. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 208 (White, J., dissenting).
306. 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1976).
307. LABUY, MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 33 F.R.D. 523,
567 § 6.01-3 (1%3): "A 'reasonable doubt' means a doubt based on reason and it must be
substantial rather than speculative, it must be sufficient to cause you as a reasonably prudent
person to hesitate to act in the more important affairs of your life."
308. 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010 (1974).
309. As noted in United States v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1973): "Proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt would seem to require a greater evidentiary showing by the
government than proof beyond a substantial doubt." See also United States v. Alvero, 470 F.2d
981 (5th Cir. 1972).
In United States v. Fallen, 498 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1974), the court held that equating
"substantial doubt" with "reasonable doubt" was harmless error where the "proper concept of
reasonable doubt" had been conveyed to the jury and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. In
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lenge was made in United States v. Gratton. 310 Relying in part on Bridges,
the court noted that although such an instruction was objectionable, in the
absence of rule 30 objection, 311 such an instruction was not plain error. In
United States v. Crouch ,312 the defendant had made a timely objection to the
use of the LaBuy instruction. The court affirmed the giving of the instruction,
however, adhering to "the general proposition that reviewing courts will not
reverse when the instruction considered as a whole is not prejudicially
erroneous. " 31 3 The court noted, however, that if the Gratton decision and the
reasoning contained therein had been available to the trial court, the court
would have exercised its supervisory power and reversed the lower court. 314
The issue was raised most recently in United States v. Wright.315 There,
the defendant had not objected to the instruction at trial. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the admission of the instruction, relying on Gratton. There was no
indication in the record that the trial court was aware of that decision. The
court stated that, in view of Gratton and Crouch, it should now be clear "that
a district court giving a reasonable doubt instruction containing the chal-
lenged equation notwithstanding a rule 30 challenge can reasonably expect a
reversal." 31 6 The court also stated that it expected district courts to sua sponte
remove the phrase from the standard instructions even in the absence of an
objection.
In United States v. Schaffner,317 the jury had been instructed that the
government was not required to prove the defendant guilty beyond all
possible doubt, because if that were the case "few men, however guilty they
might be, would be convicted., 318 Although the instruction favored the
government, the court affirmed since, considering it as a whole, the instruc-
Fallen, the defendant made a timely exception on the specific grounds enunciated in Atkins. In
light of the Seventh Circuit's pronouncement in United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.
1976) (see note 315 and accompanying text infra), that a district court can expect reversal where
such an equation is made, the reasoning of Fallen should not be persuasive where such an
instruction is used after the date of the Wright opinion. To that extent Wright constitutes a
conflict with the Eighth Circuit.
In Bridges, the trial judge also stated that "reasonable doubt" was "not for the purpose of
letting guilty men escape." 499 F.2d at 186.
310. 525 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1090 (1976).
311. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. The court noted that
The mere offer of the instruction does not preserve the error for appeal. If the party
whose tendered instruction is refused fails to object to the refusal, stating distinctly the
grounds of his objection, the Court of Appeals may review the refusal to instruct only
to determine whether it constitutes plain error within the meaning of Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(b).
525 F.2d at 1162.
312. 528 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976).
313. Id. at 631.
314. Id. at 631 n.2.
315. 542 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1976).
316. Id. at 988.
317. 524 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1126 (1976).
318. Id. at 1023.
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tion was less prejudicial than that considered in Bridges. However, the court
suggested it not be used in future cases.
In United States v. Rajewski3 ' 9 and United States v. Marzano ,320 the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the proper instruction to be given with respect to
accomplice testimony. In Rajewski, the defendant was charged in part with
obstruction of justice by procuring perjured grand jury testimony. The
perjurer testified against him at trial. The defendant argued that imporper
presentation of the case by the government masked the witness' participation
in the scheme as a perjurer and that therefore, the standard credibility,
accomplice and informer instructions were insufficient. 32' The informant
instruction offered by the defendant related closely to the uniform informer's
instruction. The court upheld the given instruction, noting that instructions
must be considered as a whole and that the trial judge has wide discretion as to
the words used in an instruction. 322
The defendant further contended that the accomplice instruction in
United States v. Echeles323 was much more direct than the one given at trial.
The court held that, given the trial court's broad discretion in formulating
exact language to convey the content of the instruction, Echeles merely
established one acceptable, but not exclusive, formulation. With regard to the
instruction for an admitted perjurer, the court's instruction was deemed
sufficient since it told the jury that they could disregard his entire testimony
because of that fact.
319. 526 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1975).
320. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. .1976).
321. LABuY. MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, §§ 6.05, 6.07,
6.08; 33 F.R.D. 523, 573-80 (1963).
322. When the trial court omits giving an accomplice instruction and the accomplice is the
sole occurrence witness or much of his testimony is uncorroborated, the court will reverse.
United States v. Wasko, 473 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 439 F.2d 1105 (9th
Cir. 1971). See also Tillery v. United States, 411 F.2d 644(5th Cir. 1969) (where the defendant did
not request accomplice instruction and accomplice supplied sole evidence against defendant,
trial judge was obliged to admonish jury). For an exhaustive treatment of accomplice instructions
in federal criminal cases, see Annot., 17 A.L.R. Fed. 249 (1973).
323. 222 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 828 (1955). The trial court had given the
following instruction:
If you believe that any witness who testified in this case actually took part in the
commission of a crime, if in fact you believe from all the evidence that a crime or
crimes were committed, then that witness is considered an accomplice and his
testimony should be received with care and caution and scrutinized carefully. How-
ever, the mere fact that a witness may be an accomplice does not mean that he cannot
tell the truth. It only means that you are to examine his testimony with care, and if,
having done so, you believe it is the truth, then you are to give it the same credence as
the testimony of other witnesses.
Id. at 160. It had also followed the instruction with a charge to the jury:
The weight and credit to be given to the testimony of a person who has admitted his
part in the commission of a crime, if any person had made such admission, and if in fact
you do find that a crime has been committed and that the witness took part in its
commission, is for you to decide.
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In United States v. Marzano,324 the court gave the standard LaBuy
accomplice testimony instruction with a slight grammatical variation. The
defendant offered an instruction that the testimony of an accomplice witness
should be received with great care. Citing Rajewski, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the trial court had broad latitude in choosing the exact language of
an instruction. The defendant also argued that part of the instruction improp-
erly advised the jury that it could convict on the accomplice's testimony alone
even though he had not testified to all the elements of the crime. The court
rejected this argument, holding that in the "context of complete instruc-
tions," it was inconceivable that the jury could not have understood the
instruction to mean that if it believed him on the points to which he testified,
his testimony would be sufficient on those points. Marzano finally argued
that since the purpose of the instruction was to protect him, he had a right to
have no instructions given on the accomplice issue. Since he did not make this
objection at trial, the court held that the giving of the instruction did not
constitute error. 325
The court also decided cases dealing with the proper instructions to be
given on the issues of witness identification, 326 presumption of guilt 327 and
statutory defense. 328
PLEAS AND PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
Only one case decided in the past year dealt directly with rule 11329
which sets forth the requirements for guilty pleas. Faulisi v. Daggett
330
involved an appeal from a district court denial of a motion for the vacation of a
guilty plea. The basis of the appeal was the defendant's contention that the
court had failed to advise him that the sentence in the federal charge could run
consecutively to that of a state sentence he was already serving. The issue
presented to the court was whether the possibility of consecutive sentences
was a consequence which the defendant should have been advised of prior to
324. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976).
325. Id. at 274.
326. United States v. Kimbrough, 528 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976) (United States v. Hodges,
515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975), which held that an instruction on identification would be required
does not mandate a specific instruction). See United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.
1976) (where no actual issue of identification and tendered instruction inaccurate, trial court
properly refused tendered instruction).
327. United States v. Bailey, 526 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1975) (not erroneous to give instruction,
over defendant's objection, that a presumption of guilt may not be drawn from his failure to
testify).
328. United States v. Tritton, 535 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (in prosecution for
distributing cocaine in violation of statute, since testimony did not contain an evidentiary basis
for defendant's theory that the substance in question was not included in the statutory definition,
an instruction tendered on the statutory definition of cocaine was properly refused).
329. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
330. 527 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1976).
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acceptance of a guilty plea. The court held that the requirements of rule 11
were met since the district court had advised the defendant of the maximum
sentences on both charges. 33
1
Although rule 11 requires that the district court find a factual basis for a
guilty plea, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Gratton ,332 held that there
is no similar requirement for a plea of nolo contendere. 333 In that case, the
court considered whether a policy of refusal to accept nolo contendere pleas
without an expression of guilt by the defendant was reversible error. 334 The
holding in Gratton was limited to the facts of the case. No plea bargain had
been made, 335 the conviction would have been for the same offense had the
nolo contendere plea been accepted,336 and no civil liability was likely to
develop from the transaction involved.337 Since the defendant had made no
showing that the nolo contendere plea would be appropriate and that no
prejudice would follow as a result of the conviction after trial rather than on
the plea, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the plea should have
been accepted.
The plea negotiation process was also the subject of United States ex rel.
Robinson v. Housewright.338 For the first time in this circuit the court directly
held that it is not constitutionally impermissible for the trial judge to enter into
plea negotiations prior to a tentative agreement being reached between the
prosecutor and the defense attorney. 339 The opinion in Moody v. United
States,3° had recognized that plea bargaining is an essential component of
the administration of justice.341 That decision also recommended that all
district judges make an expanded rule 11 inquiry. 342
In Robinson, the court did not have any supervisory power over the
Illinois state courts. Thus, the court had to determine whether the inquiry
recommended in Moody was founded on the protection of constitutional
rights. It determined that it was not. The Seventh Circuit accepted the
331. Accord, Villareal v. United States, 508 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1974); Williams v. United
States, 500 F.2d 42(10th Cir. 1974); Tindall v. United States, 469 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972); Johnson
v. United States, 460 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1972); Hinds v. United States, 429 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1970); Anderson v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 387 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd on other grounds, 405
F.2d 492 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 (1969).
332. 525 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1975).
333. Id. at 1163.
334. Id.
335. See United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
336. Id.
337. See United States v. Dorman, 4% F.2d 438(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 945 (1974).
338. 525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1975).
339. Id. at 990-91.
340. 497 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1974).
341. Id. at 362-65.
342. Id. at 365. This inquiry recommended by the court was viewed as an interim measure
until rule 11 amendments were made. These amendments have since taken effect in rule I I(e) and
(g). Act of July 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 3(5)-(10), 89 Stat. 371, 372.
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argument that the Illinois courts would not hold all judicial participation in
plea bargaining to be unconstitutional and improper, ultimately resolving
Robinson on the basis that the defendant's plea was voluntary.
SENTENCING
The court considered three cases last year which presented nearly
identical issues: 34 3 the defendant who chose to stand trial received a longer
sentence than codefendants who had pleaded guilty. The defendant argued
that his longer term indicated that he had been penalized for exercising his
right to stand trial. The Seventh Circuit dismissed this argument in all three
cases, reiterating that mere disparity between a sentence given a defendant
who pleads guilty and to another convicted after trial does not, by itself, prove
that the latter was penalized for exercising his constitutional right to stand
trial. In another opinion the court rejected a businessman's claim that his
sentence should be reduced to a/fine alone because of the stigma which
attaches to a businessman sentenced to prison. 344 Two other cases involving
sentencing problems presented issues which merit discussion.
United States v. Chausee 345 involved a discussion of the Assimilative
Crimes Act 346 in the context of sentencing. The defendant alleged that he
should have been charged and sentenced under a federal statute347 instead of
under the Illinois statute employed in the indictment. 348 His post-trial motion
for reduction of sentence was denied on the ground that the federal and state
statutes did not prohibit the same conduct. The defendant relied on a Second
Circuit case 349 which held that the federal statute described an assault, while
the state statute described a battery. This distinction was rejected by the
Seventh Circuit, based on its analysis that a reading of the full federal statute
indicates that the crime described therein is broader than a classical assault
and includes battery. 350 The defendant's conviction was affirmed, but the
case was remanded for resentencing pursuant to the federal statutory
provisions. 351
Faye v. Gray352 presented a sentencing issue not previously considered
343. United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Peskin, 527
F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975).
344. United States v. Dreske, 536 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Cook v. Gray, 530 F.2d
133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2187 (1976), and United States v. Donner, 528 F.2d 276 (7th
Cir. 1976), for two cases where arguments were unsuccessfully made that sentences should be
reduced.
345. 536 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1976).
346. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
347. Id. § 113(c).
348. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-4 (1975).
349. Fields v. United States, 438 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1971).
350. 536 F.2d at 644. See also United States v. Anderson, 425 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1970).
351. 536 F.2d at 645.
352. 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1976).
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by the Seventh Circuit. The petitioner in a habeas corpus action argued that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment required that the
presentence jail time he had served be credited against the sentence imposed
by the trial judge because that confinement was due to his inability to post
bond 313 In deciding the question presented, the Seventh Circuit had to choose
between two positions which the courts have taken in light of the United
States Supreme Court decisions on this question. 35 4 Some courts have held
that a failure to credit pre-sentence confinement which results from the
inability to post bond is a denial of equal protection if that period of
confinement combined with the imposed sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum penalty allowed for the offense."' Other courts have held that the
constitution requires the crediting of pre-sentence time served due to defend-
ant's indigency, regardless of whether or not the combined time exceeds the
statutory maximum. 356 A further refinement of this latter interpretation holds
that where the total time of incarceration is less than the statutory maximum
penalty, a presumption exists that the sentencing court credited the pre-
sentence time in imposing sentence on the defendant.35"
The Seventh Circuit had previously adopted the presumption analysis in
a case358 involving the construction of the federal sentencing statute. 359 The
353. Faye also made an argument based on the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy, relying on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The court found the argument
unpersuasive because "[clourts. . . have only taken the teaching of Pearce so far as to hold that
a failure to credit violates the guarantee against double jeopardy when the pre-sentence time
together with the sentence imposed is greater than the statutory maximum penalty for the
offense." 541 F.2d at 667. Since Faye's imposed sentence combined with the pre-sentence time
served was less than the statutory maximum, the double jeopardy argument failed.
354. The United States Supreme Court decisions are Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)
(which held that it was a denial of equal protection to limit punishment to payment of a fine for
those financially able to pay but to convert the fine to imprisonment for the indigent), and
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (which struck down the practice in Illinois of incarcerat-
ing beyond the maximum term those individuals unable to pay a fine, stating "the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on
imprisonment for any substantive offense to be the same for all individuals irrespective of their
economic status." 399 U.S. at 244).
355. E.g., Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231(5th Cir. 1976); Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625
(5th Cir. 1974); Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1974); Hill v. Wright, 465 F.2d 414 (5th
Cir. 1971).
356. E.g., King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975); Ham v. North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406
(4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1970); Monsour v. Gray, 375 F.
Supp. 786 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974); Workman v.
Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio), vacated in part as moot, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972).
357. See King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975); Monsour v. Gray, 375 F. Supp. 786
(E.D. Wis. 1973); Withers v. North Carolina, 328 F. Supp. 1152 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
The case which originated the concept of such a presumption of credit for pre-sentence time
was Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966), which construed the federal sentencing
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
358. Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970).
359. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970). Two other circuits have followed the District of Columbiaand
Seventh Circuits in this analysis. See United States v. Downey, 469 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1972);
Swift v. United States, 436 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Brotherton
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court left open the question of whether it was appropriate to invoke a
presumption in a case such as Faye, which presented a constitutional claim
rather than a statutory claim. Noting that other decisions have questioned the
validity of this approach, 36° the Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to
decide the issue since, on the facts it was clear that the judge had not allowed
credit for time served. Thus, even if a presumption had arisen it was clearly
rebutted. The dissenting judge indicated that he would have reached the
constitutionality of such a presumption, stating that a rebuttable presumption
may be constitutionally invoked. 361 Further, he argued that the presumption
may be rebutted only by a clear showing that no credit was given for the time
served.
While the opinion in Faye does not decide the issue, an examination of
the majority and dissenting opinions may be of assistance to counsel who
desire to raise the pre-sentence time credit issue.
In United States v. Dorszynski ,362 the Seventh Circuit further interpreted
the Youth Corrections Act,363 the statutory sentencing provisions for youth
and young adult offenders. The court held that its previous decision in United
States v. Neve, 31 that offenders subject to sentencing under the YCA be
prosecuted by indictment, is not retroactive. 3 61 It also pointed out that a recent
United States Supreme Court decision, 366 while requiring a specific "no
benefit" finding for youth offenders prior to adult sentencing, does not
require that the finding be accompanied by reasons.
367
PAROLE REVOCATION AND PAROLE RELEASE
In United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 368 the Seventh Circuit held
that due process requires that reasons be given for the denial of parole release
in considering the denial of a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition.
Although the court had held earlier 369 that the Administrative Procedure
Act370 required that reasons be given for denial of parole in a federal parole
release hearing, the issue of whether due process required the giving of
v. United States, 420 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970). One circuit, in a case decided after Stapf and
before Holt, has apparently rejected the presumption. Padgett v. United States, 387 F.2d 649 (4th
Cir. 1967).
360. See, e.g., King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1975), and Schoenhurst, Presentence
Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1051, 1065 (1972).
361. 541 F.2d 665, 669 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
362. 524 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1975).
363. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as YCA].
364. 492 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1974).
365. 524 F.2d at 194.
366. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
367. 524 F.2d at 194.
368. 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976).
369. King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
370. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970).
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reasons had not been squarely faced by the court. Other circuits, however,
had confronted the issue and had concluded that due process does require the
giving of reasons for denial of parole release. 371 The Seventh Circuit, relying
on these other decisions and analyzing relevant United States Supreme Court
opinions, 372 concluded that "due process includes as a minimum requirement
that reasons be given for the denial of parole release."- 373
Richerson also involved the question of whether the reasons set forth in
the Illinois parole release statute374 adequately apprised the defendant of the
reason for denial so as not to violate due process. The court found that the
comparable provisions of the federal regulations375 were substantially similar
so that interpretative federal case law could serve as a guide in assessing the
adequacy of the Illinois provision. The court held that the reasons given to
Richerson, 376 namely, that early release under the circumstances of his
offense would "deprecate the seriousness of such an offense, 377 combined
with suggestions to him for future conduct were sufficient to satisfy due
process requirements. In assessing this sufficiency, the court adopted the test
of the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New
York Board of Parole. 378 This test 379 requires that the reasons given should be
adequate enough to enable a reviewing body to determine whether the denial
of release was permissible. Detailed findings are not necessary if all relevant
factors are considered by the board. The court did not reach the issue of
whether merely meeting the statutory requirements, without more, would
satisfy due process since the board in Richerson had considered other factors.
371. Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 998(1975);
Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419
U.S. 1015 (1974). But see Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972), revd,
477 F.2d 278 (1973) (en banc). See generally Recent Developments, Parole Release-Federal
Circuits Conflict on Applicability of Due Process and Administrative Procedure Act to Parole
Release Decisions, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1257-77 (1974).
372. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
373. 525 F.2d at 800.
374. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1975).
375. 18 U.S.C. §4203(a); United States Bd. of Parole Rule §2.18,40 Fed. Reg. 41,333 (1975).
376. 525 F.2d at 801.
377. Id.
378. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
379. The test, as formulated by the Second Circuit is:
To satisfy minimum due process requirements a statement of reasons should be
sufficient to enable a reviewing body to determine whether parole has been denied for
an impermissible reason or for no reason at all. For this essential purpose, detailed
findings of fact are not required, provided the Board's decision is based upon
consideration of all relevant factors and it furnishes to the inmate both the grounds for
the decision ...and the essential facts upon which the Board's inferences are
based. ...
500 F.2d at 934.
The Seventh Circuit found this test consistent with the United States Supreme Court's
analysis of minimum due process requirements for revocation of good time credit as stated in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974). 525 F.2d at 804.
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In other cases, the court held that Richerson and King v. United
States38° would not be applied retroactively.381 McGee v. Aaron ,382 decided
prior to Richerson, however, held that due process does not require that the
board conduct what would amount to a rehearing once written reasons have
been given for denial of parole. 383 Finally, the Seventh Circuit recommended
to lower courts that, even though the federal rules 384 do not require a right of
allocution at re-sentencing following revocation of probation, it would be the
"better practice" to personally address the defendant and allow him to
speak.385
An interesting jurisdictional question was raised in Napoles v. United
States .386 The petitioner had been sentenced in Illinois. While he was serving
a period of probation, he moved to Texas and jurisdiction over him was
transferred there pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3653.387 A Texas court entered an
order revoking his probation because of a violation of certain probation
provisions. Napoles subsequently filed in Illinois a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
2255388 to vacate or modify the original sentence because his guilty plea had
been accepted without compliance with rule 11. 389 The district court denied
the motion for lack of jurisdiction, having found that jurisdiction had lodged
with the Texas court. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that a section 2255 motion must be brought before the court whose proceed-
ings are being challenged. 390 The decision centered on whether probation
should be construed to be a sentence within the meaning of the two statutory
sections involved. Although the court noted that the courts are split on this
issue,3 9 1 it chose to follow the example of the Fifth Circuit392 which held that
380. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974) (a failure to give reasons for denial of parole to a federal
prisoner violates the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970)).
381. Bailey v. Holley, 503 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1976); Berkeley v. Benson, 531 F.2d 837 (7th
Cir. 1976). Berkeley involved a defendant who had originally been part of the group which
initiated Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974). Berkeley's petition was dismissed,
however, because he had had a second parole release hearing at the point at which approximately
one-third of his sentence had been served.
382. 523 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975).
383. The petitioner in McGee did not receive a hearing following his sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970) until 20 months of his four year sentence had been served. According to
the court, this delay was improper under the holding of Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th
Cir. 1974). However, this contention was not raised by the petitioner.
384. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1).
385. United States v. Core, 532 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1976).
386. 536 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1976).
387. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1970).
388. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
389. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
390. This holding was in accord with the other two decided cases on this issue. Martin v.
United States, 248 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1957); Woods v. Rogus, 275 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1957).
391. The cases which hold that probation is not a sentence, United States v. Fultz, 482 F.2d I
(8th Cir. 1973); Zaroogian v. United States, 367 F.2d 959 (1st Cir. 1966); and Bartlett v. United
States, 166 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1948), did so in other contexts.
392. In contrast to those cases cited at note 391 supra, the Fifth Circuit case of Smith v.
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probation is a sentence for the purposes of section 3563. 393
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is constantly presented
with opportunities to decide issues of imporantce relating to criminal proce-
dure. Because the development of the law in this area is so comprehensive, it
is unusual for the court to be faced with a truly novel issue. This is
demonstrated by the fact that only in the wiretap decisions is significant law
developing. Some degree of inconsistency is reflected in the opinions, largely
due to the fact that many decisions are written, not by permanent members of
the court, but by judges sitting by designation. This in itself is an indication of
the heavy burden borne by the court. The quality of the opinions is extremely
high, however, and is to be commended.
It seems appropriate to mention here two important issues which the
author believes may be presented to the Seventh Circuit during the coming
year. The first issue, in the fourth amendment area, is whether, absent exigent
circumstances, law enforcement personnel may enter a private dwelling to
arrest an individual whom they have probable cause to arrest but no warrant.
Such arrests occur almost daily, but the United States Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the problem and it may well arise in this circuit in the next year.
The second issue which may be litigated here arises from the increased
frequency with which the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act 394 is being used as a basis for indictments relating to cases involving fraud
against the government. Although the constitutionality of the statute itself has
been upheld on numerous occasions,3 95 the manner in which it is now being
used will require further construction of the statute. Government fraud cases
have increased dramatically in both number and complexity in the past year.
The RICO statute provides a useful tool for attacking some of the problems
raised by those cases, but its use has been and will continue to be challenged.
No doubt, the opportunity to resolve some of these challenges will soon be
provided to the Seventh Circuit.
Criminal litigation in this circuit provides challenges to the government,
United States, 505 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974), involved a construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3653 and held
that in that context "[pirobation is a sentence like any other sentence." Id. at 895.
393. In United States v. Scuito, 531 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1976), the court held that where a
probationer is not in custody pending a probation revocation hearing, the preliminary hearing
mandated by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), is not required.
394. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as RICO].
395. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Grancich v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 777 (1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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to defense attorneys, and to the courts. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has in the past, and will undoubtedly continue in the future, to provide
the steadying force and guidance that all participants in such litigation
require.
